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LIQUIDATED DAMAGES, PENALTIES AND THE
JUST COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE: SOME NOTES
ON AN ENFORCEMENT MODEL AND A THEORY
OF EFFICIENT BREACH
CHARLES J. GOETZ* and ROBERT E. SCOTT**
INTRODUCTION
For more than five centuries, strict judicial scrutiny has been applied
to contractual provisions which specify an agreed amount of damages upon
breach of a base obligation.' Although the standards determining the en-
forceability of liquidated damage clauses have developed novel and laby-
rinthine permutations, 2 their motivating principle has remained essentially
immutable. For an executory agreement fixing damages in case of breach to
be enforceable, it must constitute a reasonable forecast of the provable
injury resulting from breach; otherwise, the clause will be unenforceable as
a penalty and the non-breaching party will be limited to conventional
damage measures. 3
The historical genesis of this principle sheds some light on its original
rationale. Relief against penalties was one of the earliest exercises of
equitable interference, having developed during the fifteenth century when
the common law had no adequate machinery for trying cases of fraud. 4 At a
time when legal rules permitted double recovery through the sealed penalty
bond,5 as well as other recovery grounded in fraud, a presumption by the
* Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law; A.B., 1961, Providence
College; Ph.D., 1964, University of Virginia.
** Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law; B.A., 1965, Oberlin College;
J.D., 1968, William & Mary; S.J.D., 1973, University of Michigan.
The authors wish to acknowledge the significant contribution of Mr. Charles G. Cofer,
B.A., 1974, Duke University; J.D., 1977, University of Virginia School of Law, in the
preparation of this article. Mr. Cofer is primarily responsible for the material concerning the
historical background of the penalty rule and also assisted in the preparation of the footnotes.
1. See 5 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 293 (1924). Relief from
agreed damage provisions was premised on the notion that it was against "conscience" that a
person might recover damages exceeding the loss which he suffered. Undoubtedly, one
underlying fear was that fraud or other unconscionable conduct was involved.
2. See text accompanying notes 21-28 infra.
3. The rationale for designating a particular liquidated damages provision a penalty has as
many formulations as there are treatments of the doctrine. For a representative sampling, see
5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1054 (1964); G. GRISMORE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW or CON-
TRACTS § 234 (rev. ed. 1974); C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 599-608
(1935); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339 (1932); 5 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 775A (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1961); Brightman, Liquidated Damages, 25
COLUM. L. REv. 277 (1925).
4. See 5 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 292-93. According to Holdsworth, the
rules of equity at the mid-point of the fifteenth century were very vague. Combined with the
turbulence of the country, these vague rules "gave rise to many interferences of the chancel-
lor on the grounds of equity and conscience." Id. at 278. Such broad interferences may have
been prompted by perceived defects in common law rules. Id. at 278-87. Since there were no
legal rules available to relieve against unconscionable bargains, equity filled the gap. Id. at
292.
5. It was not uncommon that a debtor "for further security" would bind himself for
double the amount of the actual debt. "[H]e might pay the debt, and still the creditor, armed
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early equity courts that liquidated damage provisions carried an unusual
danger of oppression and extortion would have seemed well justified. 6 In
addition, the promisor faced information barriers greatly increasing the risk
of overestimating his ability to perform. 7 Consequently, the equity courts
apparently refused enforcement when either actual or presumptive evi-
dence of unfairness indicated that recovery would result in an "unjust,
extravagant or unconscionable quantum of damages in case of a breach."'
The common law courts soon usurped and subtly altered the develop-
ing penalty rule, invalidating the agreed remedy in any case where it
specified a significantly larger amount than conventional damage recovery.9
Applying the principle of "just compensation for the loss or injury actually
sustained" 10 to liquidated damage provisions, courts have subsequently
refused enforcement where the clause agreed upon is held to be in
terrorem-a sum fixed as a deterrent to breach or as security for full
performance by the promisor, not as a realistic assessment of the provable
damage. II Thus, attempts to secure performance through in terrorem
clauses are currently declared unenforceable even where the evidence
shows a voluntary, fairly bargained exchange.
12
with his sealed writing, could collect the full sum named in the deed; for the common law
received such evidence as conclusive." Barbour, The History of Contract in Early English
Equity, in 4 OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 89 (P. Vinogradoff ed. 1914).
6..By the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, formalized rules were developed for
the exercise of equity jurisdiction in order to give relief against accident and sharp practice. 5
W. S. HOLDSWORTH, supra note I, at 330. The relief against penalties was by this time almost
a separate branch of equitable jurisdiction.
7. It is characteristic of men, however, that they are likely to be beguiled by the
'illusions of hope,' and to feel so certain of their ability to carry out their engage-
ments in future, that their confidence leads them to be willing to make extravagant
promises and commitments as to what they are willing to suffer if they fail.
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 147, at 601.
8. Thompson, Penalties and Liquidated Damages, 46 CENT. L.J. 5 (1898) (emphasis
in original).
9. This development did not go unnoticed:
[P]aternalism would be well enough... if it limited itself to setting aside, or refusing
to enforce, stipulations for unconscionable damages. But, as actually administered in
the courts, it does not so limit itself. Proceeding on fictitious rules of interpretation,
while pretending to be making an effort to ascertaining [sic] the real meaning of the
parties, the courts have swamped themselves in all manner of difficulties, floundering
in which their judgments result in setting aside fair bargains as to damages in cases
where the damages are incapable of assessment, as well as unconscionable or ex-
travagant bargains in cases where the damages are capable of assessment.
Id. at 6.
10. Jaquith v. Hudson, 5 Mich. 123, 133 (1858).
11. Henderson-Boyd Lumber Co. v. Cook, 149 Ala. 226, 42 So. 838 (1906); Muldoon v.
Lynch, 66 Cal. 536, 6 P. 417 (1885); Metz v. Clay, 101 Kan. 45, 165 P. 809 (1917); Benfield v.
Croson, 90 Kan. 661, 136 P. 262 (1913); H. J. McGrath Co. v. Wisner, 189 Md. 260, 55 A.2d
793 (1947); Quigley v. C. S. Brackett Co., 124 Minn. 366, 145 N.W. 29 (1914); City of Rye v.
Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 34 N.Y.2d 470, 315 N.E.2d 458, 358 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1974); Chaude
v. Shepard, 122 N.Y. 397, 25 N.E. 358 (1890); Feinsot v. Burstein, 161 App. Div. 651, 146
N.Y.S. 939 (1914).
12. The implications of the penalty doctrine are anomalous in terms of the theoretical
underpinnings of modem contract law. The prevailing principles of contract developed coinci-
dentally with the emergence of a market economy in the nineteenth century and reflect the
assumption of classical economics that no neutral principle exists whereby the end result of a
freely bargained exchange can be measured. The doctrinal concern has, therefore, centered on
the necessity of reliable, objective evidence of a voluntary exchange, rather than an examina-
tion of the disparity in the utility of the exchange to the contracting parties. See L. FRIED-
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The continuing vitality of the penalty doctrine can best be explained by
examining the assumptions underlying the application of the "just compen-
sation" principle to liquidated damage provisions. 13 The central assump-
tion is that enforcing an in terrorem clause overcompensates the non-
breaching party. The current penalty rule is therefore envisioned as a
protection against (1) unfair recovery in excess of justifiable reliance, 14 and
(2) the performance of a contract through fear of the penalty, where it
would be more efficient economically to breach.' 5 The assumption of
overcompensation, however, is gratuitous. We argue below that its uncriti-
cal application frequently induces a costly reexamination of the initial
allocation of risks and may also deny the non-breaching party either ade-
quate compensation for the harm caused by the breach 16 or the opportunity
to insure optimally against such harm.
MAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 24446 (1973); J. W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDI-
TIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES 11-12 (1956); Horowitz,
The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 917, 918 (1974).
Prior to the emergence of a market economy, the law of contract had been based upon socially
imposed notions of equity. This was a reflection of the prevailing belief that the justification
for contractual obligation could be "derived from the inherent justice or fairness of an
exchange." Id. at 917. One of these equitable notions was that there was some "intrinsic
value" to an exchange which could be recognized objectively by the courts through an
application of the principles of justice and fairness. As the growth of commercial markets
continued, equitable notions such as "intrinsic value" were substantially eroded. By way of
illustration, Professor Horowitz states:
Markets for future delivery of goods were difficult to explain within a theory of
exchange based on giving and receiving equivalents in value. Future contracts for
fungible commodities could only be understood in terms of a fluctuating conception
of expected value radically different from the static notion that lay behind contracts
for specific goods; a regime of markets and speculation was simply incompatible with
a socially imposed standard of value.
Id. at 946-47.
As a consequence of the bargain theory, traditional fairness constraints have been limited
to two broad categories: In the first category are process controls designed to identify mistake,
fraud, undue influence, duress or other bargaining abnormalities which challenge the assump-
tion of fairly bargained exchange. This category also includes status controls-infancy and
insanity-which challenge the assumption that the contracting parties possessed the capacity
to evaluate the exchange. These obvious forms of bargaining unfairness render a contract
voidable at the option of the promisor. See generally I A. CORBIN, supra note 3, at 13-15,
635-36. The second category is characterized by limitations on the subject matter of permissi-
ble bargains. "Illegal" bargains are proscribed because the subject matter of the exchange is
deemed socially detrimental. The categories of illegality are as amorphous and impervious to
theoretical analysis as is the underlying concept of public policy. Traditional examples of
illegal bargains include those that restrain trade, interfere with the administration ofjustice,
promote fraud or other injury to third parties, or are harmful to other social institutions-the
family, marriage or perceived morality. See generally 6A Id. at §§ 1373-1517.
13. The penalty doctrine continues to be strictly followed. Garrett v. Coast & S.
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 9 Cal. 3d 731, 511 P.2d 1197, 108 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1973) (late
payment charge measured against unpaid balance of loan constitutes cause of action for
invalidation on ground of penalty); Plymouth Sec. Co. v. Johnson, 335 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. 1960)
(forfeiture of payments on a cemetery purchase after six months; default held a penalty); City
of Rye v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 34 N.Y.2d 470, 315 N.E.2d 458, 358 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1974)
(bond provision specifying liquidated damages for delay in contract with city constitutes an
unauthorized penalty); American Financial Leasing & Servs. Co. v. Miller, 41 Ohio App.2d
69, 322 N.E.2d 149 (1974) (liquidated damage provision in service station equipment lease
held to be a penalty); U.C.C. § 2-718(1), Comment 1; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339,
Comment h to subsection (2) (1932).
14. See Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L. Q. 495,
499-501 (1962); note 30 infra.
15. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 55-60 (1973); Hartzler, The Business
and Economic Functions of the Law of Contract Damages, 6 AM. Bus. L. J. 387, 392-93
(1968).
16. Over the years, occasional critics have challenged the validity of the assumption of
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Part I of this Article examines the role of liquidated damage provisions
and penalties in the context of a general theory of efficient breach of
contract. 17 The proof problems inherent in fully recovering idiosyncratic
values within the context of operationally practical damage sanctions may
prevent the non-breaching party from recovering his subjective expecta-
tions if recovery is limited to legally determined remedies. The expected
cost of establishing true losses under conventional damage measures will
thus induce parties who face uncertain or nonprovable anticipated losses to
negotiate stipulated damage agreements. The current penalty rule subjects
these agreements to costly review, based not on the fairness of the process,
but on whether the initial estimate sufficiently mirrors the anticipated
provable loss.
Part II examines the hypothesis that, absent evidence of process un-
fairness in bargaining, efficiency will be enhanced by the enforcement of an
agreed allocation of risks embodied in a liquidated damage clause. 18 We
argue that agreed damage measures and in terrorem provisions represent,
under many circumstances, the most efficient means by which parties can
over-compensation. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 277, 286-87 (1972) (penalty principle infringes upon freedom to negotiate
distribution of risks resulting from breach); Thompson, supra note 8, at 6-7 (fictitious rule of
interpretation is a judicial abridgment of freedom of contract); C. McCoRMICK, supra note 3,
§ 147; Brightman, supra note 3, at 279-81. Professor Brightman observed in 1925 that where
the courts have invalidated agreed remedies because of an in terrorem clause they have often
worked unjust results. His inference of unfairness is based on the premise that the court has
deprived one of the parties of his bargained-for exchange on the unsupported ground that his
motive for the bargain violates public policy. Id. at 283.
17. The jurisprudential bases of contract have undergone severe challenges in the last
generation. See generally P.S. ATIYAH, CONSIDERATION IN CONTRACTS: A FUNDAMENTAL
RESTATEMENT 27-45 (1971); L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 15-18, 20-24
(1965); Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974). Although the
obituary of classical contract theory has only recently been published in Professor Gilmore's
provocative essay, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974), its death was presaged by the wide-
spread acceptance of the triumph of legal realism, the Uniform Commercial Code. The
non-static conception of promissory liability has destroyed the theoretical efficacy of a formal
doctrine of consideration as a necessary and sufficient theory of obligation. Recently, how-
ever, several scholars have pointed perceptively to sparks of life remaining in the corpse. For
particularly thoughtful essays on the continued vitality of contract jurisprudence, see Speidel,
An Essay on the Reported Death and Continued Vitality of Contract, 27 STAN. L. REV.
1161 (1975); Henderson, Book Review, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1466 (1976).
In response to the theoretical limitations of a formal doctrine of consideration as well as
the open-ended realism of commercial reasonableness, some have suggested the application of
the efficiency criterion. See, e.g., Birmingham, Damage Measures and Economic Rationality:
The Geometry of Contract Law, 1969 DUKE L.J. 50; Hartzler, supra note 15, at 393; Birming-
ham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV.
273 (1970); R. POSNER, supra note 15; Barton, supra note 16.
18. The hypothesis which forms the basis for the enforcement model presented here was
first proposed without significant elaboration by Professor Barton in his article exploring the
economic bases of damages measures in the absence of clear market alternatives. See Barton,
supra note 16. In particular, Professor Barton recognizes that there may be certain subjective
expectations that a party to a contract might wish to protect. Id. at 281. Allowing the parties
to arrange a set of damage rules in the form of liquidated damage provisions may provide such
protection. Barton attributes the invalidation of many liquidated damage provisions to a
general reluctance on the part of courts to accept damage rules set by the parties. Id. at
282-87. See also Brightman, supra note 3, at 279-83.
Professor Brightman also reached the conclusion that liquidated damages clauses, unless
shown to be unconscionable, should be enforced. It is not clear, however, whether he
advocated such a rule to protect any "idiosyncratic" value of the non-breaching party, or only
to protect the value of the agreement that the usual laws of compensation identify. See
id. at 283.
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insure against the otherwise non-compensable consequences of breach.
Our hypothesis is then also tested against a series of conditions in order to
identify alternative legal principles that may provide less costly means of
avoiding the harmful effects whose perception apparently prompted the
current penalty rule.
I. THE JUST COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE:
A THEORY OF EFFICIENT BREACH
A. The Role of Damage Agreements Under the Just Compensation Stan-
dard
The modem law of contract damages is based on the premise that a
contractual obligation is not necessarily an obligation to perform,' 9 but
rather an obligation to choose between performance and compensatory
damages. 20 Once a contemplated exchange has been negotiated, the
breaching party is merely required to provide "just compensation" equal to
the value of performance. The implications of this rule can be usefully
illustrated through the principles of economic analysis. Generally, breach
will occur where the breaching party anticipates that paying compensation
and allocating his resources to alternative uses will make him "better off"
than performing his obligation. As long as the compensation adequately
mirrors the value of performance, this damage rule is "efficient." It in-
duces a result superior to performance, since one party receives the same
benefits as performance while the other is able to do even better. Under the
current damage rule, all of these net gains from breaching are retained by
19. One purpose of contract damages which has been suggested is that they tend to
prevent breach. The fact that damages must be paid upon breach "makes, therefore, for the
security of business transactions and helps to make possible the vast structure of credit, upon
which so large a part of our modem prosperity depends." 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 3, at 34.
This analysis is, however, belied by the absence of punitive measures designed to reduce the
incentives to breach. On the contrary, it is clear that the central purpose of contract damages
is compensatory and not punitive. See, e.g., Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of
Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (1970); Speidel & Clay, Seller's Recovery of
Overhead Under UCC Section 2-708(2): Economic Cost Theory and Contract Renedial
Policy, 57 CORNELL L. Q. 681, 683-85 (1972). Indeed, a strong argument can be made that the
theory of damages is designed to err toward undercompensation. For example, costs, attor-
neys' fees and certain categories of pre-judgment interest are not recoverable by the non-
breacher. Although the economic bases of the compensation principle have not been fully
articulated, it is clear that the principle is, at least intuitively, consistent with a theory of
efficient breach-providing incentives for the promisor to breach a contract which has become
inefficient ex post, compensate the promisee for his expected gain, and reallocate his re-
sources to more highly valued uses. The incentives are provided by permitting the promisor to
retain all the gains from breach. See generally Birmingham, supra note 17, at 273; Hartzler,
supra note 15, at 388-97; Barton, supra note 16; R. POSNER, supra note 15, at 55-59.
20. Nowhere is the confusion between legal and moral ideas more manifest than in
the law of contract. Among other things, here again the so called primary rights and
duties are invested with a mystic significance beyond what can be assigned and
explained. The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you
must pay damages if you do not keep it-and nothing else. If you commit a tort, you
are liable to pay a compensatory sum. If you commit a contract, you are liable to pay
a compensatory sum unless the promised event comes to pass, and that is all the
difference.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897).
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the breacher-the non-breacher is in the same position as if there had been
performance. In order to maintain the efficiency value of the rule, however,
it is only necessary that some minimal amount of benefits are retained by
the breacher in order to induce him not to perform. The allocation of the
gains from breach is, therefore, largely a question of wealth transfer be-
tween the contracting parties.
Facing this conventional damage measure, contracting parties have
incentives to negotiate liquidated damages clauses whenever the costs of
negotiating are less than the expected costs resulting from reliance on the
standard damage rule for breach. There are two primary factors which
might induce the decision to negotiate:
(1) The expected damages are readily calculable, but the
parties determine that advance stipulation will save litigation or
settlement costs;(2) The expected damages are uncertain or difficult to estab-
lish and the parties wish to allocate anticipated risks.
Of course, these factors may be present singly or in combination.
Pre-breach agreements will not be legally enforceable, however, unless
two requirements coincide. First, the agreement must be a reasonable
forecast of just compensation for the anticipated harm that would be
caused by the breach. 21 Second, the possible damages which might result
from the breach must be uncertain and difficult to estimate. 22 However,
liquidated damages provisions have seldom been voided solely because the
damages were easy to estimate. 23 Instead, courts have considered the
degree of uncertainty an influential factor in determining the reasonable-
21. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339(I)(a), Comment on subsection (1) (1932);
U.C.C. § 2-718(1), Comment 1 (1961 version); 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1059; C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 149. Most courts correctly assess the reasonableness of the
stipulated damage provision ex ante, i.e., as of the time at which it was made. McCarthy v.
Tally, 46 Cal. 2d 577, 297 P.2d 981 (1956); Better Food Mkts. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 40
Cal. 2d 179, 185, 253 P.2d 10, 14 (1953). For an application of the requirement, see Gorco
Constr. Co. v. Stein, 256 Minn. 476, 99 N.W.2d 69 (1959).
22. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339(I)(b), Comments on subsection (1) (1932); 5 A.
CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1060; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 148; J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 232 (1970). As with the reasonableness requirement, this
difficulty in estimating damages must be present at the time of contracting. Parker-Washington
Co. v. City of Chicago, 267 Ill. 136, 140-41, 107 N.E. 872, 874-75 (1915). This uncertainty
requirement has been criticized, especially by Professor McCormick:
If the agreement reasonably approximates the probable damages which a court would
give, why forbid the parties thus to agree, even if the damage could be readily and
exactly foreseen? If they can by agreement thus relieve the judge or jury of the task
of fixing damages, even though that task should be an easy one and its result could
readily be forecast, there seems to be no sound objection to their doing so.
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at 605. McCormick contends that the ease or difficulty of
predicting damages in advance of breach neither increases nor decreases the chances of an
oppressive bargain. Therefore, there is little reason to depart from the general rule that courts
will enforce the agreement of the parties according to its terms. Id. But see Macneil, supra
note 14, at 501-03.
23. See generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 22, § 232; C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 3, at 605-06 (discussion of cases). But see Garrett v. Coast & S. Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 9 Cal. 3d 731, 511 P.2d 1197, 108 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1973).
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ness of the estimate.2 4 If the conditions inducing damage agreements are
viewed on a continuum, the application of the penalty rule becomes
clearer: as the uncertainty facing the contracting parties increases, so does
their latitude in stipulating post-breach damages. 25
The threat of subsequent review clearly increases the costs of negotiat-
ing a damages clause relative to relying on the standard damages rule. Are
these costs accompanied by counterbalancing advantages? The traditional
justification for post-breach inquiry is prevention of "unjust" punishment
to the breacher, i.e. compensation exceeding the harm actually caused. 26
This justification has been expressed in two distinct forms. One basis for
invalidation is the presumption of unfairness: liquidated damage provisions
are unreasonable-a penalty-whenever the stipulated sum is so dispropor-
tionate to provable damages as to require the inference that the agreement
must have been effected by fraud, oppression, or mistake.27 The other
24. [In proportion as the difficulty of ascertaining the actual damage by proof is
greater or less, where this difficulty grows out of the nature of such damages, in the
like proportion is the presumption more or less strong that the parties intended to fix
the amount [reasonably].
Jaquith v. Hudson, 5 Mich. 123, 138 (1858). See also W. HALE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
DAMAGES 214 (2d ed. 1912).
25. It appears that the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code have tacitly adopted this
approach. Section 2-718(1) of the U.C.C. allows parties to liquidate damages for breach as
long as the amount stipulated is "reasonable." The reasonableness of a particular amount is
determined, in part, by the "difficulties of proof of loss" from the breach. While it might be
argued that the U.C.C. rule approximates the common law uncertainty requirement, as does
the I NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMIS-
SION FOR 1955, STATE OF NEW YORK, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
581-82, it appears that a change has been made. The language of U.C.C. § 2-718 itself treats
"uncertainty" as merely one factor, and not even a required one, of many to be considered in
determining reasonableness.
In addition to uncertainty, courts have also been influenced by the relationship between
the stipulated amount and the provable harm actually caused by the breach. Although a
number of courts have refused to enforce agreements because of the absence of provable
losses upon breach. many cases have held that actual loss is irrelevant except as it permits
inferences concerning the reasonableness of the agreements viewed ex ante. Frick Co. v.
Rubel Corp., 62 F.2d 765, 767-68 (2d Cir. 1933); In re Lion Overall Co., 55 F. Supp. 789
(S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd sub nom. United States V. Walkof, 144 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1944); Bryon
Jackson Co. v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Cal. 1940); McCarthy v. Tally, 46 Cal.2d
577, 297 P.2d 981 (1956). But see Rowe v. Shehyn, 192 F. Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 1961); Marshall
v. Patzman, 81 Ariz. 367, 370-71, 306 P.2d 287, 290-91 (1957); Gorco Constr. Co. v. Stein, 256
Minn. 476, 481-84, 99 N.W.2d 69, 74-76 (1959). See generally Macneil, supra note 14, at
504-509: Sweet, Liquidated Damages in California, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 84, 131-33 (1972).
26. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339 (1)(a), Comment on subsection (1), Comment a
(1932).
27. This rule was originally outlined in Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n v. Moore, 183
U.S. 642 (1901). In applying the Sun Printing rule to a later case, the Supreme Court stated:
[Ejffect will be given to the [liquidated damage] provision, as freely as to any other,
where the damages are certain in nature or amount or are difficult of ascertainment or
where the amount stipulated for is not so extravagant or disproportionate to the
amount of property loss, as to show that compensation was not the object aimed at
or as to imply fraud, mistake, circumvention or oppression. There is no sound reason
why persons competent and free to contract may not agree upon this subject as fully
as upon any other, or why their agreement, when fairly and understandingly entered
into with a view to just compensation for the anticipated loss, should not be en-
forced.
Wise v. United States, 249 U.S. 361, 365 (1918).
The unfairness rule has also been applied in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205
U.S. 105, 119 (1907); and Gruschus v. C. R. Davis Contracting Co., 75 N.M. 649, 655, 409
P.2d 500, 504 (1965). See also Thompson v. St. Charles County, 227 Mo. 220, 235-41, 126
S.W. 1044, 1049-50 (1910).
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major basis for invalidating agreed remedies is that, since the courts set
damages based upon the principle of just compensation, parties should not
be allowed to recover more than just compensation from the courts through
a privately concocted alternative arrangement, even one fairly negotiated. 28
The common theme of these decisions is that a disproportion between
the stipulated and the anticipated damage justifies an inference of over-
compensation. In turn, overcompensation implies either bargaining unfair-
ness or an objectionable in terrorem agreement to secure performance. 29
This line of reasoning suggests two benefits which may be expected from
the current rule invalidating penalties.3 0 First, the cost of identifying un-
fairness may be reduced by a standard rule-of-thumb based on dispropor-
28. The relationship between just compensation and liquidated damages was first articu-
lated clearly in Jaquith v. Hudson, 5 Mich. 123, 133 (1858).
29. In some cases, the two invalidating rationales have been entwined. For example, in
Wise v. United States, 249 U.S. 361 (1918), the Supreme Court found agreed remedies to
be reasonable unless they are so disproportionate to provable damages "'as to show that
[just] compensation was not the object aimed at or as to imply fraud, mistake, circumvention
or oppression." Id. at 365 (emphasis added). This bifurcated approach has produced concep-
tual confusion. Some cases identify the compensation limitation as the primary basis of
invalidation. Better Food Mkts., Inc. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 179, 186-87, 253
P.2d 10, 15 (1953); Benfield v. Croson, 90 Kan. 661, 136 P. 262 (1913); H. J. McGrath Co. v.
Wisner, 189 Md. 260, 55 A2d 793 (1947). Other decisions isolate unfairness as the appropriate
decision rule, and implicitly view in terrorem provisions as a type of unconscionable conduct.
Equitable Lumber Corp. v. IPA Land Dev. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 516, 522-23, 344 N.E.2d 391,
395-97, 381 N.Y.S.2d 459, 462-64 (1976); Waggoner v. Johnston, 408 P.2d 761, 769-70 (Okla.
1965). But the prevailing tendency, as represented by the Uniform Commercial Code, is to
specify a reasonableness requirement without indicating an invalidating rationale. U.C.C.
§ 2-718(1) provides that
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at
an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused
by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility
of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liqui-
dated damages is void as a penalty.
Comment 1 to § 2-718 indicates that unconscionability is entwined with the notion of
reasonableness and that §§ 2-302 and 2-718 might overlap in certain cases. However, the
enumeration of the elements to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a liqui-
dated damage clause seems designed to implement as well the compensation limitation. At least
one court has apparently interpreted § 2-718(1) as embracing a dual standard. See Equitable
Lumber Corp. v. I.P.A. Land Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 516, 344 N.E.2d 391, 381 N.Y.S.2d 459
(1976).
30. The traditional justification has been that penal clauses violate public policy because
contracting parties, overly optimistic about their capacity to perform obligations, will be
subject to severe hardship. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 3, at 601.
Recently, additional justifications have been proposed which require more careful analy-
sis. Professor Macneil has developed the thesis that the criterion for enforcing any agreed
remedy should be whether it fills an inadequacy of the law and protects the reliance interests
of the promisee. Macneil, supra note 14, at 498. Macneil, however, accepts the premise that in
terrorem provisions violate public policy. He concludes that since the parties to a contract
realize that in terrorem clauses will not be enforceable, they do not place any reliance upon
them. Therefore, by refusing enforcement the courts do not deprive the parties of any reliance
interest. Relying upon logic which is not wholly free from circularity, Macneil finds no
impairment of freedom of contract, because there is no reliance interest to be protected by the
agreed remedy. Id. at 499-500. Macneil does not reject the possibility that some in terrorem
provisions may be enforceable. He states that
[I]f there should be substantial provable or hidden reliance on the 'penalty' clause,
i.e., the promisee thinks at the time that the deal is made, that the base promise will
not be performed. then we have alternative base promises, rather than simply an
additional sanction for performance of one base promise. If there is such reliance on
the alternative promise, we are no longer dealing with a penalty but with alternative
contracts, and failure to enforce the alternative promise will result in an infringement
of the power of contract.
Id. at 500. For a discussion and criticism of the "alternative contracts" concept, see text
accompanying notes 60-67 infra.
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tion.31 Second, an enforceable in terrorem clause might discourage prom-
isors from breaching and reallocating resources where changed circum-
stances would ordinarily create efficiency gains from this behavior.32 In-
ducing performance under these conditions is a misallocation which pre-
vents the net social gain that would result from nonperformance.
As the efficient damages model formalized below will demonstrate,
however, this analysis incorrectly assumes that, rather than negotiating out
of the penalty, the promisor who is subject to an in terrorem clause will
inevitably undertake an inefficient performance. 33 In addition, there is no
basis for the apparent assumption that the premium placed by the promisee
on performance is valueless. Indeed, the market paradigm on which the
compensation standard is based requires a contrary presumption; a prom-
isee has a recognizable utility in certain in terrorem provisions and this
utility is frequently reflected in willingness to pay a price for such clauses,
Clearly, the effects of the current penalty rule cannot adequately be
assessed until its underlying assumptions are articulated. In order to de-
velop the efficiency value of agreed remedy provisions within the basic
compensation standard, it is first convenient to formalize an analytic model
in which "just compensation" for nonperformance can be given precise
meaning.
B. The Efficient Damages Model
Critiquing the overcompensation assumption requires an analysis of
the effects of a penalty rule on the costs of enforcing the compensation
standard. Potential enforcement costs include the direct costs of litigation
as well as those error costs generated by legal rules which fail to mirror
accurately the behavior to be regulated. Formalizing an analytic model in a
"friction free" or costless environment provides a useful first step in
elevating these effects.
31. See the discussion of the benefits of precision in legal rulemaking in note 55 infra.
32. Hartzler notes that enforcing penalty clauses might also have adverse effects on the
bargaining process and contract formation. He assumes that contract law provides incentives
to contract formation by protecting expectation interests through the award of damages. From
this, he observes that damage awards that exceed the "just compensation" amount go
beyond the realm of protecting the nonbreaching party's expectations. One result of this
excessive protection of expectation damages is that it "may introduce a deterrent to the
very contract making behavior to be encouraged." Hartzler, supra note 15, at 392. According
to Hartzler, this deterrent would have three inefficient manifestations:
(1) instances in which insistence on an in terrorem provision results in a refusal to
contract, because the promisor is unwilling to assume the risk of breach;
(2) instances in which the penalty itself becomes an independent contract objective,
resulting in an artificial allocation of risks; and,
(3) instances in which the promisor may contract below his capacity in order to
avoid breach and the subsequent imposition of the penalty, because he perceives
the penalty as a real threat.
Id.
The difficulty with this analysis is that it assumes that the expectancy created by the
inclusion of an in terrorem clause in the contract is not a "valid" interest upon which to
predicate an award of damages. This assumption is inconsistent with the premises underlying
the bargain theory of contract.
33. See text accompanying notes 38-42 infra.
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FIGURE IA
1. Efficient Contract Reallocation Under the Compensation Standard.
The rationale of modem contract theory can usefully be articulated in
terms of the "indifference curve" analysis commonly used in economic
theory. Figure IA is an adaptation of the economic trading model familiarly
known as the "Edgeworth Box." 34 The potential trade partners, B and S,
34. For a useful explanation of the theory of contract damages in terms of indifference
curves and the Edgeworth Box, see Birmingham, Damage Measures and Economic Rational-
ity: The Geometry of Contract Law, 1969 DUKE L.J. 50.
Basically, indifference curve maps may be thought of as mapping a "preferredness moun-
tain" wherein higher "elevations" represent the greater preferredness of outcomes. The
points in any single indifference curve constitute outcomes having equal preferredness, i.e.
results among which the individual in question would profess indifference or a state of equal
satisfaction. When indifference curves are used in mapping a preference "mountain," their
significance is exactly analogous to the equal-evaluation "contour lines" on a standard
topographical map. The indifference curve labelled 1b, is a plausibly drawn contour
line for B because his more preferred results (closer to his mountain's "peak") are presum-
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are assumed to have started with money holdings of $80,000 and $20,000
respectively, for an aggregate of $100,000. Also, B is assumed to have a
zero stock of "goods," the product being traded, while S has 100,000 units
of goods. By measuring B's holdings from an origin at the southwest comer
of the box and S's holdings from the northeast comer, we can represent, as
a point in the box, any possible division of the aggregates of money and
goods between B and S. For instance, the initial situation is represented by
R0, where B has 0 goods (bottom scale) and $80,000 (left-hand scale).3s
A contract between B and S would be representable as an agreement
to move from the original or status quo ante result R, to a new result such
as R. The initial contractual equilibrium of this result is represented in
Figure 1A by the tangency of seller's indifference curve (Is1) and buyer's
( 1 ) at R,; only at R, can each party reach the level of preferredness
represented by these two curves. The expected post-contract result R,
implies that B will give up $75,000 in money holdings, with an exactly
equivalent receipt to S, in exchange for S's delivery of 75,000 units of
goods to B.
Presumably, S and B agreed to this contract initially in the expectation
that result R, was, for both of them, preferred to the original result R.
However, the motivation for breach will ordinarily be that the perceived
advantages of an agreement at the time of contract have been modified by
changed conditions. Hence, if a potential breach is to be analyzed, we
should expect to find that one of the parties now "regrets" the promise to
move from R0 to R.
As Figure IA is drawn, changed conditions have shifted the seller's
indifference curve (Is,) back toward the notheast origin. 36 The seller now
perceives the agreed upon post-performance result (Re) as an inferior
outcome when compared to the status quo ante (R.) and thus an incentive
to breach exists. 7 In terms of Figure 1A, the just compensation principle
of modem contract theory is representable by B's indifference curve Ib,.
This curve not only indicates solutions equivalent (equally preferred by B)
ably in the northeast direction where B's stocks of money and goods are increasing. Exactly
the opposite reasoning applies for S, whose "peak" of preferredness is approached by moving
toward the southwest, where S's money and goods stocks are maximized. Conceptually, an
indifference curve can be drawn through any point on the map of possible results in the
Edgeworth Box. However, in order to avoid excessive clutter of the diagrams, it is customary
to provide only the indifference curve segments actually necessary to understand the general
contours of the individual's preferences about outcome. In this application, it will be necessary
to remember only that (1) for B, any point southwest of his indifference curve lb, is
inferior to the promised performance of R, and (2) for S, any point southwest of his indiffer-
ence curve Is, through & is preferred to performance while any point northwest is inferior.
35. Note that if we look at the situation in terms of S, the point R. is unchanged. It
represents S's holding of $20,000 and 100,000 units of goods.
36. It should be emphasized that conditions inducing breach need not always be rep-
resented by a "shiftback" in the seller's indifference curve. It could equally occur where the
buyer's curve shifted. The essential condition to breach is that the changed circumstances
indicate that the parties' indifference curves are no longer tangent at the contract point (R).
37. The movement from R. to R, is a movement down the preferredness surface for the
seller. It places S on an indifference curve (I,) which is northeast of P& and thus inferior to R0in S's eyes. See note 34 supra.
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to full performance at R,, but also identifies end results southwest of Ibi
which would fail to provide the buyer with an outcome meeting his original
"expectations" of performance at R. Since Ib, does identify results which
are, from B's standpoint, interchangeable with full performance (Re), this
important indifference contour will be termed the "quasi-performance"
curve. The concept of quasi-performance expresses the fact that any point
on the curve places the buyer in the same preferredness situation as if
performance had taken place.
As Figure IA is drawn, full breach by the seller would require that S
pay B $15,000 in damages in order to move the buyer from the non-
performance solution R to the appropriate point Rf on the quasi-
performance curve. Point Rf is the appropriate solution precisely because it
supplies B with the equivalent of performance when no goods at all are
delivered. Figure 1A is also drawn to reflect the fact that S can do even
better by tendering partial performance of 15,000 units, thus creating the
post-compensation result of Rb. Result Rb, permitting the seller to move to
a new higher indifference curve I,,, is preferable to both R, and Rf. It is the
most preferred readjustment available to S since the law guarantees to B at
least some point on the quasi-performance curve. Not only is solution Rb
unambiguously superior to performance at R, but it also represents an
"efficient" end result in the sense that there is no movement from Rb
possible without making at least one party worse off.38 In reaching Rb, the
seller would collect the original contract price of $1 per unit for the 15,000
unit partial performance, but would then be required to remit to the buyer
$7,500 in damages in order to provide B with his quasi-performance expec-
tation at Rb rather than the no compensation result Rj.
This efficient damage model indicates that upon total or partial non-
performance the seller's obligation is to provide "just compensation"
sufficient to place the buyer on his quasi-performance curve. Since the
points along this curve represent the buyer's subjective preferences be-
tween performance and compensation, "just compensation" may require
consideration of nonobjectifiable elements in determining appropriate com-
pensation to the non-breaching buyer. In the costless environment rep-
resented by the model, this personal and potentially subjective compensa-
tion is readily identifiable. Consequently, legal damages would always be
able to provide subjective compensation to the non-breacher, and the
parties would never be induced to negotiate a liquidated damages agree-
ment. As the discussion below demonstrates, the incentive for these
agreements arises only when costs are reintroduced into the analysis. 39
38. The point Rb is superior as Figure IA is drawn because it makes the seller bliter ofby putting him on indifference curve I, while retaining the buyer on his indifference plateau
1b,. The result is also "optimal" in the sense that any movement away from Rb would
necessarily produce an inferior result for one of the parties.
39. See text accompanying notes 43-58 infra.
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FIGURE IB
2. The Operation of a Penalty Provision. We now define a "penalty"
as damages imposed over and above the "just compensation" represented
by the non-breaching party's quasi-performance curve. If paid, penalty
damages will place the non-breaching party in a position actually preferable
to performance, i.e., "higher" on the preference map than curve lb, of
Figure IA. For instance, assume that S had agreed to pay B non-per-
formance damages at the rate of $5.33 per unit. In effect, this agreement
would replace the "ordinary" damages constraint Ibi with the negotiated
"penalty" constraint represented on Figure 1B by dashed line RkR,. If S
chooses any level of non-performance, the penalty component of the dam-
ages is the vertical difference between the quasi-performance curve, which
denotes the compensatory standard, and the negotiated remedy rate em-
bodied in line RkR. For instance, if S delivers only 60 thousand units, he
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
must pay $80,000 ($5.33 x 15,000) damages, represented by the vertical
distance Rm to Rj. Of this amount, compensatory damages correspond to
the vertical distance Rm to Rn while penalty damages are exactly as indi-
cated by the vertical distance Rn to Rj.
Figure lB has deliberately been constructed to show why penalty
damages may be considered objectionable. If B insisted on the enforcement
of the penalty provision, S would choose to perform fully. Yet, consider
any point in the shaded area bounded by the quasi-performance curve (Ib)
and the seller's own indifference curve (Is2) running through the full per-
formance point R. Movement from R, to any point in the shaded area will
represent an unambiguous improvement over R, in the sense that at least
one party will prefer the new solution to R, and the other party will find it
at least as good as R. Under these circumstances, if the penalty provision
really did cause the solution to "stick" at R,, enforcement of the penalty
would lead to results clearly inferior to allowance of the orthodox recovery
standard which would motivate movement to a superior point such as Rb.40
The situation summarized in Figures IA and 1B also indicates, how-
ever, that there will be an incentive for B to renegotiate his penalty rights
whenever the enforcement of these rights leads to an inefficient end result.
For instance, B would likely not insist on the penalty provision of $5.33 per
unit but might offer a revised sliding scale of damage rates designed to
induce S to partially breach and to slide along S's own performance-
equivalent curve Is2 toward solution Rg. This would enable B to move to his
superior indifference plateau Ib, at no disadvantage to S. Realistically, Rg is
only a limiting solution, since it gives all the efficiency gains from breach to
B, thus depriving S of any real incentive to breach. However, any infinites-
imally lower scale of damages giving some of the benefit of the breach to S
might induce S to move to a solution which approaches Rg in the limit.41
In sum, the principle embodied in present law of giving the non-
breaching party "just compensation" or quasi-performance leads to one
limiting result, in which all the efficiency gains go to the breacher. But the
payment of substantial overcompensation, i.e., penalties, is not necessarily
incompatible with an equally efficient result in the neighborhood of the
other limiting solution Rg where (infinitesimally less than) all of the
efficiency gains from breach go to the non-breaching party. Ranging be-
tween these extremes, there are an infinite number of other efficient breach
solutions where both parties divide the gains from breach, such as R,, all of
which embody varying combinations of compensatory and "penalty" dam-
ages. Obstinate insistence on the enforcement of certain penalties may
result in a failure to exploit potential efficiency gains by inducing the
40. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
41. In turn R, is an efficient allocation, "unimprovable" in the sense that there is no
possibility of increasing one party's interest except at the cost of a loss to the other because it
is a point at which the indifference curves of the two parties are tangent.
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penalized party not to breach. However, the very existence of such un-
exploited gains acts as an incentive to the holder of the penalty rights to
renegotiate the penalty provision in question. Hence, the existence of an
overcompensation provision is never per se evidence of an efficiency im-
pediment. Absent significant negotiation costs, the prestipulation of a pen-
alty still permits alternative post-breach efficient solutions in which the
efficiency gains are divided between the breacher and non-breacher in a
bargained-for manner.42
Is there, then, no fairness content to the analysis of alternative reme-
dies? Modern contract theory seems primarily concerned with providing a
"standard" compensatory rule which supplies an incentive for efficient
breaches to be made and resulting gains to be fully exploited. It does not
draw upon any obvious principle of fairness in evaluating the post-breach
end result. As noted above, the "just compensation" formula gives all of
the gains to the breacher. Why should this end result be regarded as any
"fairer" than one which splits the gains fifty-fifty or gives them all to the
non-breacher? In terms of Figure 1B, this question requires the observer to
evaluate alternative efficient solutions such as Rb, R,, and Rg in fairness
terms. Allocatively, for society, these solutions are indistinguishable; they
differ only in terms of wealth transfers, the manner in which the gains from
non-performance are distributed between the parties. It seems then that the
only appropriate fairness inquiry is one concerned solely with process
fairness, the bargaining conditions, and not an examination of end results.
However, if "penalties" are to be attacked on this basis, the affirmative
case must be made that penalties are in some way symptomatic of those
market conditions which characterize process unfairness.
C. The Objective Compensation Limitation: Problems of Idiosyncratic
Value and Uncertainty
The efficient damages model demonstrates that in an ideal environment
the existing damage rule has no allocative or fairness advantages. The just
compensation standard can nonetheless be supported as the preferable rule
if one views it as the simplest of the alternative means of allocating the
gains from breach and setting the conditions for further negotiations. A
separate problem, however, is raised by the penalty rule which prevents
the parties from altering this allocation by agreement. Evaluating the ef-
fects of this rule requires specifying the conditions where the costs of
enforcing the just compensation principle might induce parties to negotiate
an alternative allocation.
42. In the absence of a penal bond, the settlement would be at Rb and the seller would
retain all of his utility gains from breaching at R, and moving to a higher indifference plateau
Is,. The only effect of the penal provision, absent transaction costs, is to induce a transfer of
some of those gains by the seller to the buyer in exchange for a release from the penal
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1. The Costs of Implementing a Compensation Standard. Under the
just compensation rule, the breacher must provide a compensation/
performance mix which will place the non-breaching party on the quasi-
performance curve which equals his contractual expectations. Where the
values represented by the points forming the quasi-performance curve are
reflected in an existing market, the legal sanctions necessary to implement
the compensation principle are easily formulated. 43 The breacher provides
a monetary compensation either reflecting the damage based on contract-
market differential 44 or profits from the anticipated exchange. 45 In either
case, the recovery is that sum necessary to provide the equivalency of
performance based on an objective market valuation. Alternatively, where
the subjective values represented by the non-breacher's indifference curve
are not reflected in any established market, the compensation principle
constraint. See text accompanying notes 82-86 infra where the ex ante estimation of renegotia-
tion costs is explicitly addressed.
43. A basic assumption of contract damages is that the " 'value' of a performance...
means the amount of money that can be obtained in exchange for it in some market." 5 A.
CORBIN, supra note 3, at 137. See text accompanying notes 51-54 infra. Even in cases where
value is assumed to be so limited, implementation of the compensation principle requires
difficult judgments concerning the appropriate "market" from which measurement can be
taken. As Professor Corbin has noted:
The term 'value' and the term 'market price' are often used in law books, in judicial
opinions, and in statutes as if they represented a definite and easily determinable
amount of money. It is very clear that such is not the case, and that, in a determina-
tion of values and market prices, a great deal of pure guess work is frequently
indulged.
5 A. CORBIN, supra note 3, at 137.
44. Where the parties are able to act on the market, for example, by reselling goods upon
buyer's breach or purchasing substitutes where seller defaults-the compensation principle is
implemented by granting the non-breacher the contract-market differential. This is appropriate
because it represents the recovery of the contract risk of a shift in the market price which was
allocated to the breaching party. The assumption is that existing market opportunities together
with the market-contract differential will be equivalent to the performance expectations of the
non-breaching party. This measure, which has traditionally been identified as "lost bargain
damages," is implemented in U.C.C. §§ 2-708(1) and 2-713 for the non-breaching seller and
buyer respectively.
45. There are circumstances where even though market opportunities are present the
compensation principle cannot be implemented by the contract-market differential. This is
explicitly recognized with respect to seller's damages in U.C.C. § 2-708(2). Identifying the
compensation principle as the relevant criterion, the drafters recognized that circumstances
may arise where recovery of market fluctuations would not prove an accurate measure. Where
that occurs, the seller is entitled to recover his lost profit. Although recovery of anticipated
profit is in reality what the seller receives under the market-contract measure in U.C.C.
§ 2-708(l), market opportunities plus the market fluctuation is ordinarily a more precise
method of measurement than the cost figures necessary to identify anticipated profits. Conse-
quently, only where that method is inconsistent with the compensation principle will the seller
be entitled to use the direct profit measurement in § 2-708(2). There are at least two circum-
stances where this latter measurement becomes appropriate: (1) The "lost volume" case-
traditionally applied where the seller is operating at less than optimal capacity so that any
action in terms of existing market opportunities would have been available without buyer's
breach. But cf. Comment, A Theoretical Postscript: Microeconomics and the Lost-Volume
Seller, 24 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 712 (1973) (economic analysis suggests that few sellers will
ever "lose" a sale within the meaning of 2-708(2)); and (2) The "component parts" case-
where seller has not yet manufactured the goods so that market opportunities cannot be used.
Here, market fluctuations will have no rational relation to seller's contemplated investment,
and the seller should be required to establish his anticipated profits under U.C.C. § 2-708(2).
See Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the
U.C.C.: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 273 (1963); Harris, A Radical
Restatement of the Law of Seller's Damages: Sales Act and Commercial Code Results
Compared, 18 STAN. L. REv. 66, 70-72, 86-89 (1965).
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may be held to be inapplicable in practice; specific remedies mandating full
performance are commonly required where no monetary equivalency is
ascertainable. 46
Implementing the compensation principle is much more difficult, how-
ever, in those cases where there is a recognized market value for the
promised performance, but the promisee attaches an additional idiosyncrat-
ic value to the performance. Idiosyncratic value would include any subjec-
tive or "fanciful" valuation which varied significantly from the established
market value.47 Where the subjective utility is greater than the established
market evaluation, the compensation principle may require a subjective
basis for the compensation payment.
In Figure 2, 12 is the promisee's purely subjective indifference curve
which runs through the contract point R,. In the absence of any external
market, this indifference curve would represent the relevant quasi-
performance curve. However, if the promisee can buy or sell goods with
parties other than the promisor, the presence of such objective market
opportunities will affect the definition of the set of equally preferred quasi-
performance solutions. For instance, suppose that the market terms of
exchange between goods and money are one-to-one, i.e., goods have a
price of $1. This opportunity to transform the promised result R is rep-
resented by the market transformation curve YX in Figure 2. Although R, is
on the same subjective indifference curve as full performance R,, R may
not be regarded by the promisee as equivalent to performance at R,. The
reason is that, if R, had been achieved according to contract, the promisee
could possibly resell goods equal to the distance between X and X,, thus
arriving at Ra on a higher indifference curve I,. The implication for ordi-
nary remedy measures is that, when the promisor performs less than fully
by delivering a quantity such as Xa, the recognition of a foregone market
opportunity to resell requires compensation equal to the vertical distance
46. Specific remedies where market opportunities are not available havi long been intui-
tively used by the. courts to assure implementation of the compensation principle. See, e.g.,
U.C.C. § 2-716(l), Comment 2 (buyer's right to specific performance); U.C.C. § 2-716(3)(buyer's right to replevin where substitute goods are not available); U.C.C. § 2-709(l)(b)
(seller's right to recover the full purchase price where he is unable to resell the goods after a
reasonable effort). For a sophisticated discussion of the economic justification of specific
remedies in non-market transactions, see Barton, supra note 16, at 293-300. See also Birming-
ham, supra note 34, at 69-70 for an analysis advocating the use of specific remedies as a means
of providing incentives for a renegotiation in which the efficiency gains derived from breach
would be shared between the parties.
In certain categories of contract, such as ones for personal performance in music or
athletics, the courts have traditionally been reluctant to impose specific remedies because of
the supervisory burdens and attendant costs imposed by such a decree. In this circumstance
the deprivation, which has no market, is measured only through the unsatisfactory method of
leaving monetary value to the intuitive discretion of the factfinder. 5 A. ColRBIN, supra note 3,
§ 1003, at 38.
47. This "sentimental" or "fanciful" value has traditionally been described as "prelium
affectionis." In Thomason v. Hackney & Moale Co., 159 N.C. 299, 305, 74 S.E. 1022, 1024
(1912), a tort case, the court defined it as "an imaginary value placed upon a thing by the
fancy of its owner, growing out of his or her attachment for the specific article, its associations
and so forth, which, perhaps, may not inaptly be called its sentimental value."
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Ra Re in addition to the merely subjective compensation implicit in reaching
result Re.
Thus far, there is no inconsistency with orthodok principles of contract
breach compensation because the market measure oisloss is exactly equiva-
lent to the true losses. True losses are the higher of either (1) objective
valuation of lost market opportunities or (2) subjective valuation of lost
consumption opportunities. As long as the former exceeds the latter-i.e.,
the slope of the market transformation curve exceeds that of the indiffer-
ence curve-objective market measures of damage are perfectly appropri-
ate. Note, however, that when fewer units than Xa are held, the slope of
the indifference curve exceeds the slope of the market transformation
curve, indicating that the promisee's idiosyncratic valuation of goods be-
comes greater than the market's valuation. 48
If, then, the contract point were Ra and the promisor delivered only Xd
units, should the non-breaching party be placed, via compensation, at the
objectively valued point R, or at the subjectively valued point R? The
answer is that it depends on whether the non-breaching party has a real
48. In order to reduce his holdings of goods from Xa to Xd, the promisee would require
more money from a buyer than would the market. The market would require only enough
money to move to R, whereas the promisee would prefer to retain the goods unless he was
given enough money to move along curve I, to Rd. Thus, the promisee places greater than
market value on the goods.
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ability to "cover" by purchasing the undelivered goods at the market rate.
If this is a genuine possibility, R, is indeed an equivalent to full perfor-
mance at Ra, because it can be transformed into Ra by sliding along the
market transformation curve, i.e., buying the equivalent goods on the
market. At times, however, such ideal ability to cover is not a genuine
possibility. For instance, the breach may be unforeseen, so that adequate
cover cannot be effectuated in the market during the relevant time period.
In this case, subjectively based compensation equivalent to the vertical
distance Rd P& is necessitated in addition to the market's objective damages
in order to fully compensate the non-breacher. Existing standard damage
measures, however, will frequently not permit recovery at any point other
than R,, the theoretical measure of lost market values.
Why have ex post legal sanctions been adopted in which subjective
damage elements may not be recognized? Optimal systematic rules estab-
lishing post-breach compensation may require some limiting assumptions
concerning the extent of harm caused by contract breach. These assump-
tions reduce the direct or administrative costs of implementing the com-
pensation principle through the legal mechanism, but purchase these ad-
vantages at the price of breaking the equivalency between the damage rule
and the actual subjective harm which is difficult to assess. In assessing
damages, two limiting assumptions-valuation and foreseeability-may op-
erate to prevent the recovery of idiosyncratic value. The rule requiring the
loss to be foreseeable, designed to control for causation and remoteness, 49
can be overcome in some circumstances by pre-contract disclosure of the
causal relation between the loss and the breach and of the parameters of
reasonable foresight.50 The requirement of valuation, given the existence of
a market, is a more rigid barrier to the recovery of subjective losses. First,
the "value" of a promised performance is generally limited to "the amount
of money that can be obtained in exchange for it in some market." 51
Second, where the exchange value is conceded to be inadequate, and
"value to the owner" is substituted,5 2 any "fanciful or sentimental" value
49. 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 3, §§ 1006-1007, 1020-28.
50. The foreseeability assumption that was first articulated in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch.
Ch. 341 (1854). It limits the damage recovery of a non-breaching party to those damages
that the parties could reasonably have contemplated to result from a breach. With pre-
contract disclosure of the causal relation between the loss and the breach, the breaching party
knows which losses he will be liable for and has an opportunity to insure against anticipated
loss which the non-breacher might incur as a result of the breach. This is particularly
important when the loss is due to some peculiar circumstances of the non-breaching party.
Patterson v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co., 123 Ky. 783, 786, 97 S.W. 426, 427 (1906). See also
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 330 (1932); U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a), Comment 3; 5 A. CoRBIN,
supra note 3, § 1008.
51. 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1022, at 137. "In the process of determining
values, market prices will always be used if such prices are available." Id. at 50. See also
National Say. & Trust Co. v. Kahn, 300 F.2d 910, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Burke Hollow Coal
Co. v. Lawson, 151 Ky. 305, 306, 151 S.W. 657 (1912); White v. Schrafft, 94 N.H. 467, 471,
56 A.2d 62, 65 (1948).
52. Where market value is not a feasible measure of damages, a more elastic "value to
the owner" test will be used. The test is frequently used in the case of loss or destruction to
[Vol. 77:554
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
will be excluded on the grounds that such losses are too speculative and
uncertain.5 3 Together, these valuation and certainty limitations may well
preclude the non-breacher's recovery of idiosyncratic value.54
second hand personal property, where any market value would be plainly inadequate compen-
sation. Value to the owner is generally reached by either replacement cost or original cost less
depreciation. See Feldman v. Capital Piece Dye Works, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 426, 435 (S.D.N.Y.
1960), rev'd on other grounds, 293 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1961) (replacement value); Duka v. Hotel
Assocs., Inc., 23 Conn. Supp. 500, 502, 185 A.2d 86, 87 (Cir. Ct. 1962) (when article has no
market value, its cost may be only evidence of value available); Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. Troy,
283 App. Div. 123, 126 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1953) (replacement value is proper measure of damages
for conversion of dies and molds for plastic handles and knives); McCurdy v. Union Pac.
R.R. Co., 68 Wash. 2d 457, 467, 413 P.2d 617, 623 (1966). Cf. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 911(1939) ("... as used in this Chapter 'value' means exchange value or the value to the owner
where this is greater than the exchange value.")
53. In applying the rule that where market value is inadequate, the measure of damage for
loss or damage to property is the value to the owner, the overwhelming majority of courts
have held that this value does not include any merely sentimental or fanciful value attached to
the property by the owner. St. Louis-S.F.R. Co. v. Kittrell, 208 Okla. 147, 149, 253 P.2d
1076, 1078 (1953); Barber v. Moter Inv. Co., 136 Or. 361, 366, 298 P. 216, 218 (1931); De
Spirito v. Bristol County Water Co., 102 R.I. 50, 54, 227 A.2d 782, 784-85 (1967). See also
Nelson v. Leo's Auto Sales, Inc., 158 Me. 368, 374, 185 A.2d 121, 124 (1962) (error to permit
plaintiff to testify as to the "value to me at this time" of an automobile).
The nature of the dilemma faced by the courts in these cases is illustrated best in Furlan
v. Rayan Photo Works, Inc., 171 Misc. 839, 12 N.Y.S.2d 921 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1939), in which
the plaintiff sought substantial recovery for sentimental value and mental anguish for destruc-
tion of his deceased mother's photograph. The court, in limiting recovery to nominal damages,
held that while one could easily empathize with the plaintiff's feelings, this reaction was
sentiment, not the law, which was bound by substantive and procedural limitations. See also
Missouri, K. & T.R. Co. v. Dement, 115 S.W. 635 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909) (damages for loss of
family portraits is actual loss in money sustained by the owner).
A few courts have granted recovery of sentimental value for loss or conversion of
heirlooms where special value can be presumed. See, e.g., Brown v. Frontier Treaties, Inc.,
369 S.W.2d 299, 304 (Tex. 1963) (rule denying recovery for sentimental value not applicable
where the items have their primary value in sentiment). See also 1 T. SEDGWICK, DAMAGES
§ 251 (9th ed. 1912).
In contracts damage cases, this issue is most frequently raised as an aspect of the
requirement that the damages for non-performance be proved with reasonable certainty. The
certainty aspect of the valuation assumption is a standard which requires a minimum level of
proof in the fact and amount of damage. See, e.g., Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartrom, I ll
F. 96, 98 (8th Cir. 1909) ("The actual damages which will sustain a judgment must be
established, not by conjecture . . . but by facts from which their existence is logically and
legally inferable."); Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489 (1858). Loss of profits remains the largest
category for the application of the standards of certainty. See, e.g., Fontainbleau Hotel Corp.
v. Crossman, 323 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1963); U.S. v. Griffith, Gornall & Carman, 210 F.2d 11
(10th Cir. 1954); Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 265 I11. App. 542 (1932); Broadway
Photoplay Co. v. World Film Corp., 225 N.Y. 104, 121 N.E. 756 (1919); Keystone Diesel
Engine Co. v. Irwin, 411 Pa. 222, 191 A.2d 376 (1963).
54. Sentimental value is something that cannot be considered in the law of contracts.
The amount of compensation for a loss of this kind, however, may not be determined
by the market value of the article in question.... Sometimes the cost of replacement
may be allowed, that is, the market value of some similar article even though it will
not service some of the dearest of the purposes for which the original article was
treasured; but in the law of contracts no price will be put upon mere feelings of
pleasure or affection or feelings of sorrow and distress.
5 A. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1004, at 49. See Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Jenkins, 289 U.S. 689 (1933);
McGregor v. Watts, 254 App. Div. 904, 5 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1938).
A classic example of the denial of idiosyncratic value as compensation for breach is
provided in Carpel v. Saget Studios, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D.Pa. 1971). In Carpel, the
court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment in a diversity action for breach of a
contract to take wedding photographs on the ground that plaintiff's allegations of sentimental
value were, as a matter of law, insufficient to achieve the monetary jurisdictional limits of the
federal court. The court held that
the alleged lost sentimental value of the pictures is so highly speculative that it is not
a proper element of damages for consideration by the jury. There are no guidelines
available to aid the jury in determining a dollar value for this loss .... Since in this
case the photographs never came into existence, there is the additional question of
whether they would have had any sentimental value at all.
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A compensation limitation is justified where the reduction in the litiga-
tion costs of proving idiosyncratic harm exceeds the error costs of inaccu-
rate damage measures.55 The assumption signals the promisee who places a
higher subjective value on performance to provide for that idiosyncratic
valuation at the time of contracting unless satisfactory post-breach cover is
really achievable at market terms. One method of covering in advance for
this idiosyncratic value would be for the promisee to secure the perfor-
mance to the extent necessary by proposing a liquidated damages clause to
the prospective promisor. In addition, the compensation limitation affects
the entire continuum of cases where the losses upon breach are uncertain
or difficult to establish. Parties to contracts within this range will be
particularly induced to negotiate liquidated damage agreements because the
uncertainty in damage recovery increases the probability of error in enforc-
ing the compensation standard. Clearly, these agreements will not neces-
sarily approximate provable damages. There are at least two circumstances
where the stipulated amount may be significantly disproportionate to an-
ticipated provable loss:
(1) The expected provable damages are less than the subjective
value of performance and the agreement reflects performance
security;(2) The parties allocate a number of different risks of uncertain
damages by specifying a single damage provision for all con-
tingencies.
Both of these agreements fail under the overcompensation assumption
of the penalty rule. The first will be characterized as an impermissible
effort to induce performance by penalty even where the facts strongly
support an inference of subjective non-provable value.5 6 In the second
Id. at 1333.
This view is supported by the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 341 (1932). See, e.g.,
Illustration 2:
A contracts with B, a cremation society, for the cremation of the body of A's child, B
promising to preserve the ashes and deliver them to A on request. The body is
cremated by B, but the ashes are lost, because the label on the urn in which they
were preserved falls off and identification is impossible. B's breach of contract was
not willful. A cannot get judgment for damages for his mental suffering.
55. It is plausible to hypothesize that the legal damage rule promotes an efficiency-
enhancing reduction in the total costs of enforcement. The compensation principle is an
open-ended standard which operates at a very broad level of generality. By eliminating the
consideration of idiosyncratic value in defining the legal damage rule, an increase in ascer-
tainability is achieved by reducing the number and complexity of the relevant facts. The
benefits of this more certain legal damage rule will be reduced litigation costs and increased
foreseeability. The primary cost of this ease in measurement is the divergence between the
scope of the rule and the behavior being regulated (compensation for contract breach). In this
case the rule tends to permit conduct (inadequately compensated breach) that would be
prohibited by an unqualified application of the compensation principle. Provided that the
transactions costs of optional, more inclusive alternatives to the standard rule are relatively
modest (e.g., by private negotiation of liquidated damages), then a crude, underinclusive
standard rule produces cost savings in most cases while not unduly disadvantaging parties
involved in situations where a specially negotiated recovery rule is indeed cost-effective. Seegenerally Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEG. STUD,
257, 262-68, 285 (1974).
56. One of the clearest illustrations of an agreement where subjective value induced a
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case, where a contract specifies a single sum payable for the breach of
stipulations of varying importance, the courts have universally refused
enforcement.
57
If these conditions represented the universe of agreements affected by
the penalty rule, it might be argued that the costly effects were exceeded by
the savings on the more numerous cases where process unfairness infected
the agreement and it was unnecessary to actually prove the unfairness of
the bargaining, a costly procedure. However, a more significant aggregate
cost is produced over the entire range of cases where true losses from
breach are uncertain to some degree. Here the efficiency incentives iden-
tified earlier induce negotiated damage agreements. But the current penalty
rule imposes additional transaction costs on all of these cases, by inducing
the party who regrets the initial allocation to litigate on whether the ex ante
agreement sufficiently mirrors the anticipated losses. 58 The actuality-or
liquidated damages clause is Muldoon v. Lynch, 66 Cal. 536, 6 P. 417 (1885). The plaintiff
agreed to erect a marble monument over the grave of the defendant's husband for $18,788, the
contract providing for liquidated damages of $10 per day for delay in. completion. In declaring
the agreement void as a penalty, the court concluded:
There is nothing in this case to indicate that the defendant has suffered any actual
damage which can be measured or compensated by money... it has been generally
held that the party in whose favor the penalty or forfeiture exists must prove his
damage. In the case before us there is no claim of special damage; it might have been
quite difficult for the defendant to show any damage of a pecuniary nature for the
non-completion of the monument at the time specified, though its completion might
have been of great comfort and consolation to her affectionate remembrance.
Id. at 539-40 (emphasis added).
In City of Rye v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 34 N.Y.2d 470, 315 N.E.2d 458, 358 N.Y.S.2d
391 (1974) an agreement for $100 per day and $100,000 maximum for delay in completion of a
building complex was held void as a penalty. The court found that the harm which the city
contended it would suffer by the delay was speculative, or simply non-cognizable: "The most
serious disappointments in expectation suffered by the city are not pecuniary in nature and
therefore not measurable in monetary damages." Id. at 473 (emphasis added). See also
Security Safety Corp. v. Kuznicki, 350 Mass. 157, 213 N.E.2d 866 (1966); Gorco Constr. Co.
v. Stein, 256 Minn. 476, 99 N.W.2d 69 (1959); Norman v. Durhem, 380 S.W.2d 296 (Mo.
1964).
At the beginning of the nineteenth century in Astley v. Weldon, 126 Eng. Rep. 1318 (C.P.
1801), Lord Eldon unsuccessfully challenged the developing penalty rule. In arguing for strict
adherence to a fair exchange presumption he stated:
But nothing can be more obvious than that a person may set an extraordinary value
upon a particular piece of land, or wood on account of the amusement which it may
afford him. In this country a man has the right to secure to himself a property in his
amusements: and if he choose to [do so], I see nothing irrational in such a contract;
and it appears to me extremely difficult to apply with propriety the word 'excessive'
to the terms in which parties choose to contract with each other.
Id. at 1321.
57. See generally Wallis v. Smith, 21 Ch. D. 243, 250 (1882); Kemble v. Farren, 130 Eng.
Rep. 1234 (C.P. 1829); Astley v. Weldon, 126 Eng. Rep. 1318, 1322 (C.P. 1801) (Heath, J.).
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, § 339 Comment (b) (1932), provides that where a contract
"promises the same reparation for the breach of a trivial or comparatively unimportant
stipulation as for the breach of the most important one or of the whole contract, it is obvious
that the parties have not adhered to the rule of just compensation."
This rule has caused the invalidation of various allocations of risk by parties dealing in
arm's length transactions. See Benfield v. Croson, 90 Kan. 661, 136 P. 262 (1913) (single
payment of $500 for breach by either party of agreement to trade a stock of merchandise for a
tract of land held void as a penalty); H.J. McGrath Co. v. Wisner, 189 Md. 260, 55 A.2d 793
(1947) (liquidated sum fixedthe same for a total as for a partial breach declared a penalty).
58. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Tompkins, 240 So.2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970), rev'd on
other grounds, 259 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1972).
It is to be remembered that in the instant case the parties contracted at arm's length in
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even the mere threat-of such post-breach attacks increases the transaction
costs of contracting even in those cases where no disproportion between
agreed and anticipated damages is ultimately discovered by the court.
2. The Alternative Contract: Oasis or Mirage? Under the penalty rule,
an agreement that fails the "reasonable estimate" formulation will not be
enforced despite the expressed intention of the parties.59 Some effort to
deal intuitively with the inconsistencies of this rule can be found in the
theory of alternative contracts-the agreement does not stipulate damages
for breach, but rather an alternative contract in the event that the primary
contract cannot be performed.60 Although a few courts have used the
device of alternative contracts to sustain agreements which appeared in-
valid under the penalty rule,61 there is little support in the cases for the
assertion that proof of reliance upon the stipulated sum will permit its
enforcement as an alternative promise. Traditional analysis has distin-
no uncertain terms and there was no intimation of fraud or over-reaching on the part
of the vendors .... The vendees are in unexcused, unexplained and flagrant breach
of their contract. Thus, it is a strange and unpalatable circumstance to note the
Court's preference over the blameless vendors.
Id. at 187 (Walden, J., dissenting).
59. In Condan v. Kemper, 47 Kan. 126, 27 P. 829 (1891), the court stated
[The words of the parties with respect to damages, losses, penalties, forfeitures, or
any sum to be paid . . . must be given due consideration; and, in the absence of
anything to the contrary, must be held to have controlling force; but when it may be
seen from the entire contract, and the circumstances under which the contract was
made, the parties did not have in contemplation actual damages or actual compensa-
tion .... then the amount stipulated. .. cannot be considered as liquidated damages.
Id. at 130, 27 P. at 830 (1891). See also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 149.
The common law doctrine that liquidated damages provisions were unenforceable only if
the parties intended them as a penalty has generated much doctrinal confusion. W. HALE,
supra note 23, §§ 48-50. It appears that this confusion, and the inability of the courts to deal
consistently with the intent rule, has resulted in its abandonment. As one commentator stated,
[w]hether the parties made a real effort to estimate probable damages or intended the
stipulation to act in terrorem to encourage performance, is often stated to be impor-
tant in determining if the provision is a penalty. But intent alone is seldom the basis
of decision, and in a recent Michigan case is expressly rejected as immaterial. (citing
Wilkinson v. Lanterman, 314 Mich. 568, 22 N.W.2d 827 (1946)).
It seems unlikely that the expressed intent of the parties ever had much influence,
and [it has been argued that] since ... the only real indication of intent is the relation
between the amount stipulated and probable actual damages, intent as such is of no
importance.
Developments in tie Law-Damages, 61 HARV. L. REV. 113, 129 (1947). See also Dunbar,
Drafting the Liquidated Damage Clause-When and How, 20 OHIO ST. L. J. 221, 225 (1959);
Brightman, supra note 3, at 279-81; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339, Comment on
Subsection (1), Comment (a) (1932); 5 A. CORmN, supra note 3, § 1058; Jaquith v. Hudson, 5
Mich. 123, 138 (1858); Gorco Constr. Co. v. Stein, 256 Minn. 476, 481-82, 99 N.W.2d 69, 74
(1959).
60. Macneil, supra note 14, at 500.
61. In Blank v. Borden, 11 Cal. 3d 963, 524 P.2d 127, 115 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1974), the
California Supreme Court avoided the rigid statutory restrictions on liquidated damages by
finding a provision to pay a real estate broker the full 6% commission if the property were
withdrawn from sale to be a valid alternative contract. The Court's effort to find an analytical
basis for its decision was largely unpersuasive. As noted in dissent:
The majority never reached the issue whether the . . . clause . . . was an invalid
penalty clause .... Instead, the majority neatly sidestep [sic] this issue by labeling
the brokerage contract as one contemplating an 'alternative performance' by the
owner .... [Tihe issue in this case cannot be avoided by the facile use of labels-
otherwise any illegal penalty could be disguised as a "true option" by the promisor
to pay a substantial sum for the privilege of breaking his contract.
11 Cal. 3d at 975, 524 P.2d at 133, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 37 (Burke, J., dissenting).
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
guished the alternative provision designed to secure performance of the
primary promise from two promised alternatives between which the prom-
isor can choose, each an agreed exchange for the consideration given by
the promisee. 62 The former would be an invalid penal sanction, while the
latter an enforceable alternative contract. Since the relative market value of
the alternatives will frequently be decisive in making the distinction, the
promisee who attempts to secure idiosyncratic value or allocate uncertain
risks may still be found to have exacted an invalid penal sanction. 63
The Restatement of Contracts, in classic understatement, recognizes
that enforceable alternative contracts may easily be confused with invalid
liquidated damage provisions. 64 But a careful analysis of the legal status of
alternative contracts reveals a distinction which considerably diminishes
prospects of using this principle to uphold disproportionate agreements. If
the provision is determined to be a valid alternative contract, damages for
breach without an election of alternatives will be based on the least valu-
able alternative. 65 Consequently, where one alternative is the payment of a
specific sum of money, that sum will not determine the amount of damages
for breach where the market value of the alternative performance is less
than the stipulated sum. The effect of this provision is to preclude recovery
of a stipulated sum where it includes unprovable idiosyncratic value, or
represents an agreed allocation of risks based on uncertain damage recov-
eries.
There is in the current legal position on liquidated damages a certain
admirable tenacity. Having explicitly refused to permit the identification of
idiosyncratic value in post-breach damage measures, the legal mechanism
has resolutely precluded parties from protecting that value, either directly
or indirectly, in the contracting process. Consequently, the presumption of
overcompensation continues to be employed by many courts in avoiding
bargained-for damage agreements. Those courts unwilling to presume
overcompensation from the fact of disproportion must undertake their
analysis within the confines of the "reasonable estimate" formulation
which does not allow for idiosyncratic value.
62. Garrett v. Coast & S. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 9 Cal. 3d 731, 738, 511 P.2d
1197, 1201, 108 Cal. Rptr. 845, 850 (1973); Paolilli v. Piscitelli, 45 R.I. 354, 121 A. 531 (1923).
See also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339 Comment f (1932); C. MCCORMICK, supra note
3, at 617-18. Professor McCormick stated:
[W]hile an alternative promise to pay money when it presents a conceivable choice is
valid, yet, if a contract is made by which a party engages himself either to do a
certain act or to pay some amount which at the time of the contract no one would
have considered an eligible alternative, the alternative promise to pay is unenforce-
able as a penalty.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
63. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at 617-18.
64. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 334, Comment c (1932).
65. Id. § 344 & Illustration I at 566-67: "The damages for breach of an alternative
contract are determined . . . in case of breach without an election, in accordance with the
alternative that will result in the smallest recovery."
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II. AN ENFORCEMENT HYPOTHESIS: A MODEL OF THE
MOST EFFICIENT INSURER
Applying an efficiency analysis to contract damage rules suggests the
following enforcement hypothesis:
In the absence of evidence of unfairness or other bargaining abnor-
malities, efficiency would be maximized by the enforcement of the agreed
allocation of risks embodied in a liquidated damages clause.
This hypothesis is based on the assumption that liquidated damage
provisions will (1) reduce transaction costs where the parties determine
that the costs of negotiation are less than the expected costs of litigation
upon breach; and (2) reduce the error costs produced upon breach when
the promisee is denied recovery for his non-provable idiosyncratic value. It
follows, unless enforcement produces other inefficiencies, that enforcing
agreements negotiated ex ante will enhance efficiency by permitting the
parties to minimize the costs of transacting. The current penalty rule seems
to produce significant inefficient effects by limiting the possibilities of
mutually beneficial exchange. In addition, negotiated damage agreements
are now subject to post-breach attack as penal sanctions. This increases the
dirct costs of litigation in all cases-even where the agreement is upheld.
The situational model which will be used to test the hypothesis can be
illustrated by the hypothetical Case of the Anxious Alumnus. Assume the
following facts: Dean Smith, a 1957 graduate of the University of Virginia,
is a loyal, some would say fanatical; fai of the University of Virginia
Cavalier college basketball team. For the 1976 season, after years of sec-
ond division performances in the highly competitive Atlantic Coast Confer-
ence, the Cavaliers finally produce a team that advances to the finals of the
conference championship tournament at the end of the season. Thrdbigh
hard work and financial sacrifice, Smith acquires twenty-five tickets to the
conference championship game in Landover, Maryland. Smith enters into
contract negotiations with the Reliable Charter Service, Inc. to arrange for
a bus to transport himself and twenty-four other Virginia fans to Landover
on the day of the game. The standard price for this service is $500.
Smith considers his attendance at the game to be of supreme impor-
tance and does not relish the thought of anxious and sleepless hours
worrying whether the bus will arrive and successfully accomplish the
desired purpose. He is eager to quiet his fears by securing adequate
protection in case Reliable fails to perform. However, under the current
legal rule Smith cannot protect his unprovable reliance either by securing
fully compensating post-breach damages or a bargained-for stipulation of
the value of performance."6 Consequently, he is forced to consider other
protective alternatives.
66. See note 56 supra.
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One option is to attempt to insure against the subjective cohsequences
of breach with a third party (Lloyd's of London, for exampldi: Assumiig
that a policy could be secured and enforced up to the assesgd valuation bf
performance, 67 adding the proceeds of the policy to the award bf provable
expectation damage which Smith could recover under exisfing law would
provide him with full recovery for his idiosyncratic value ufldfl breach by
Reliable.
Alternatively, Smith could negotiate for direct insurance fr in Reliable
or any of its competitors offering the same service. Dean rfilight propose to
pay Reliable $1,000 for the charter service if, in return ibi the additional
premium, Reliable would agree to a penal sanction of $ iP,b 00 upon failure
of performance. The stipulated sum of $10,000 wdid represent that
amount at which Dean would be indifferent betweefi performance and
breach. Unfortunately, insurance purchased directly firin the promisor,
Reliable, is not a real alternative; the mere labelling of the idiosyncratic
damages as pursuant to an "insurance" contract is unlikely to prevent a
perceptive court from recognizing that such payments are de facto equiva-
lent to a penalty. Hence, legally enforceable insurance for damages not
recoverable as breach damages is in practice obtainable only from third
parties.
This insurance model and the enforcement hypothesis pose the follow-
ing issues for resolution:
(1) As between the third-party insurance company and the prom-
isor, which is the more efficient provider of insurance?
(2) To what extent do the rationales supporting the "indemnity
principle" suggest significant additional social costs due to
enforcement of agreements at stipulated values?
(3) Assuming changed conditions after an insurance agreement
has been negotiated, such that the value of performance to the
promisor is reduced, does enforcement of a penal sanction
produce a high probability of inefficient effects?
(4) What presumptions of unfairness can be developed to cope
with those special classes of cases where bargaining abnor-
malities would produce inefficient effects if stipulated damage
provisions were enforced?
A. The Efficient Insurer Model
Identifying the efficient insurer requires an analysis of the costs of
providing insurance. At what price would a profit-making commercial en-
terprise be willing to offer Smith $10,000 worth of protection against the
contingency of bus failure en route to the fabled final game of the cham-
pionship?
Perhaps the overwhelming element in the cost of this insurance would
67. Insurance recovery may be limited to actual economic loss. See text accompanying
notes 74-77 infra.
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be the expected value of the underwriting loss to the insurer. This expected
value is defined as the product pR where p is the probability of non-
performance and R is the recovery payable to the insured. In addition, an
insurer will also have other transactions costs, such as the costs of ascer-
taining the true probability p and the costs of negotiation and vommunica-
tion with the insured. These transaction costs will be subsumed in the
portmanteau variable T, so that the total cost C of a policy paying R on the
occurrence of an event with probability p can be summarized as
C = pR + T.
We assume that since the services in question are marketed competitively
in the presence of alternative sellers, the cost of breach insurance to Smith
will be (1 + a) C where a is the competitive rate of return or profit for the
insurer. The question, then, is whether C would differ between the bus
company and the third-party insurer.
An obvious focal point of interest is the transaction cost element T.
Here, it is tempting to argue that the advantage lies with the bus company.
In the first place, the bus company is in a superior position to know the
breakdown probability p. Secondly, many of the other transactions costs
normally incident to customer communication may be negligible when
communication is already being undertaken relative to the carriage service
itself. Hence, T may be lower for the bus company and thus so would C
and the offering price of the insurance to Smith.
Actually, however, the transactions cost element is not the strongest
argument in favor of the bus company as the most efficient insurer. The bus
company's main advantage derives from its power to exercise some control
over the breakdown probability p. This can be illustrated by examining
how the rational enterprise will make the maintenance and repair decisions
which affect the breakdown probability.
Figure 3 reflects the fact that there is an inverse relationship between
the probability of breakdown and the level of maintenance. 68 Each addi-
tional "dose" of maintenance reduces p, presumably by smaller and
smaller amounts as the maintenance level increases.
In Figure 4, the technological facts of Figure 3 are converted into their
investment implications. If D is the damage liability upon non-performance
(here $10,000), the expected damages decline as increasing maintenance
decreases the probability of breakdown. Since these expected damages are
pD, the saving in expected damage costs attributable to a marginal unit of
maintenance is rD where r is the marginal reduction in p brought about by
the maintenance increase. Hence, the "marginal damage reduction" curve
in Figure 4 is simply a schedule of the value rD for alternative maintenance
68. "Maintenance" is used as a summary word for all bus company activities which
potentially affect the breakdown probability.
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FIGURES 3 & 4
levels. 69 The "marginal cost" curve is, in turn, a reflection of the incre-
mental costs incurred as the maintenance level is varied. 70 The firm will
maintain the buses up to the point where the last or marginal unit of
maintenance is "just worth it," i.e. where the marginal damage reduction
curve intersects the marginal cost curve at quantity q.. 7 1
69. This is an inverse relationship as it is closely related to the curve in Figure 3. As the
maintenance increases (from q0 to q), the marginal damage reduction decreases, eventually
tending to zero, a point where increased maintenance does not reduce the probability of
breakdown at all.
70. In Figure 4, this marginal cost is a constant. Each additional unit of maintenance has
the same cost.
71. If the company would continue to maintain the buses, spending another unit of
maintenance beyond q., it would cost Cm but reduce the expected damage liability by an
amount less than Cm. This would clearly be uneconomical for the bus company.
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Absent the $10,000 liquidated damage agreement, the bus company
anticipates that D will embody only the standard objective damage recov-
ery which, let us assume, amounts to $1,000 for the Smith bus trip. This
anticipation underlies the marginal damage reduction curve in Figure 4 and
is the ultimate basis for the p0 breakdown probability. In computing the
expected underwriting loss, the third party insurance company will there-
fore arrive at a value (po" $10,000).
Suppose, however, that the bus company can offer the same insur-
ance. The expected value of damages is now based, not on a D of $1,000,
but on a D of $1,000 actual provable damages plus $10,000 insurance
recovery. Therefore, the new marginal damage reduction curve (M) for
maintenance will be exactly eleven times higher than the original one. The
company will expend additional maintenance c9sts A, equivalent to the
shaded area in Figure 4 or Cm • (q, - q0), and the breakdown probability
will consequently decline to p,.
What are the implications of these adjustments on cost? For the bus
company, the insurance cost must now be modified to reflect the net
benefits of possible risk-avoidance efforts. Hence, the appropriate cost
function for the provision by the bus company of $10,000 coverage is
C = (Po " $10,000) - [$11,000 (Po - Pi) - A] + T where the terms in the
square bracket are net gains from adjusting maintenance levels: (Po - Pl) is
the change in breakdown probability, its product with $11,000 is the ex-
pected damage reduction, and A is the added cost of maintenance. 72 We
know that these net gains are positive from the nature of their computa-
tion73 and that they would not be achieved when the third-party insurance
is purchased. Hence, even where the transaction cost component T is
identical for the alternative insurers, the bus company has an efficiency
advantage equal to the square-bracketed term in the equation above.
(Graphically, this quantity is represented in Figure 4 by the crosshatched
triangular area of net gains above the shaded area of incremental costs A
and below the new marginal benefits curve M.)
The preceding argument has been that non-enforcement of liquidated
damages provisions has the result of inducing individuals to protect against
Note that this decision of q0 maintenance also determines the probability Po in Figure 3,
the probability of breakdown when the bus company stops its maintenance and the bus
actually sets out.
72. Note that the relevant cost function for the bus company is the expected loss due to
the provision of the insurance. The present expected loss to the bus company is
C1 = ($11,000 • p,) + A + T. In computing the insurance premium, the pre-insurance expectedloss of C. = $1,000 • p, (provable damages upon breach multiplied by probability of breach)
must be deducted. The cost function is thus C, - Co = ($11,000 • P,) - ($1,000 . Po) + A + T.
The equation in the text is equivalent to this one. It is presented in a more complicated
form to demonstrate the relationship between the bus company's insurance and the third
party's. The first term is equal to the cost function of the insurance company (po " $10,000). The
bracketed term, which is positive, is then subtracted which indicates that the bus company's
insurance is less expensive by this amount than the third-party insurance.
73. See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra.
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otherwise non-recoverable losses through special third-party insurance.
This is likely to be an extremely inefficient alternative since there are
strong economic arguments that suggest that the vendor is the lowest-
cost insurer against non-performance. Although our argument has been
framed in terms of the bus company example, a similar conclusion may be
generalized to all cases in which the vendor has some control over the
probability of externally caused non-performance.
In sum, many people may not want to make deals unless they can shift
to others the risk that they will suffer idiosyncratic harm or otherwise
uncompensated damages. To the extent that the law altogether prevents
such shifts from being made or reduces their number by unnecessarily high
costs, it creates efficiency losses; that is, it prevents some welfare-
increasing. deals from being achieved.
B. The Indemnity Principle: The Problems of Wagering and Moral
Hazard
The preceding model assumed that legal principles governing the for-
mation and enforcement of aleatory contracts would permit the promisee to
secure third-party insurance to cover unprovable idiosyncratic value. We
concluded that the third-party option is likely to be relatively inefficient.
The availability of even the inefficient option must be examined more
carefully, however, in light of the principle of indemnity.74 Since a contract
insuring property rights is a contract of indemnity only, payment upon loss
is generally based not upon the face value of the policy, but upon the
provable economic lossY75 Does this general limitation on recovery suggest
reasons against enforcing insurance of idiosyncratic value? The policies
enjoining wagering and moral risk are traditionally identified as the reasons
supporting the indemnity rule. Examining these policies, however, reveals
74. See generally R. KEETON, BASIC INSURANCE LAW 69-162 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
BASIC INSURANCE]; R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW-BASIC TEXT 88-173 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as INSURANCE LAW]; E. PArERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSUR-
ANCE 247-307 (3d ed. 1955).
75. In its broadest definition the indemnity principle merely implies that the value of the
insurance benefit should not exceed the loss. At that level of generality the principle is a valid
recognition that the prevention of net gain from an insurance contract promotes two perceived
policy objectives: (1) the discouragement of wagering contracts and (2) the reduction of moral
hazard. The problem lies not with the principle as an articulated "standard," but in the legal
"rule" adopted to implement that standard which defines the measure of recovery with
reference to the exchange value of the insured's loss. The measure of recovery generally used
to determine the "actual value" of the loss is the difference between the market value of the
property before and after the loss. See, e.g., Cassil v. Newark Ins. Co., 274 Wis. 25, 79
N.W.2d 101 (1956); Engh v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 266 Wis. 419, 63 N.W.2d 831 (1954). In
c',ses where the market value is not a fair measure of indemnity of the insured's loss, an
alternative measure-replacement cost less depreciation-is frequently used. See, e.g., Agoos
Leather Cos. v. American & Foreign Ins. Co., 342 Mass. 603, 174 N.E.2d 652 (1961); Pinet v,
New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 100 N.H. 346, 126 A.2d 262 (1956). At least one commentator
has recognized that these exchange value measures might produce less than full indemnity for
the insured, particularly where the insured claims a "special relationship ... to the property
.... " The result is justified on the basis of administrative costs, however, since "getting into
the area of special value to the insured would substantially increase problems ... " See
INSURANCE LAW, supra note 74, at 146-47.
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adequate substitutes for controlling the increased social costs of the en-
forcement hypothesis.
Traditional analysis distinguishes a gambling contract which creates
risk, from a valid insurance contract which merely allocates existing risk to
a third party for a price. 76 The indemnity principle prevents parties who
shift existing risk by contract from creating additional risk through over-
valuation of the insured object. Collection of insurance coverage for an
over-valued "loss" yields a net gain to the insured. Such a contract is
therefore viewed as a gamble by the insured on the occurrence of such a
"loss."
Clearly, the policy against wagering is potentially inconsistent with the
enforcement hypothesis. Assuming that the bargaining process is fair, the
hypothesis requires enforcing all stipulated agreements without inquiry into
the nature of the underlying risks. An additional post-breach inquiry would
increase transaction costs by requiring proof of valid risk allocation by the
promisor. This issue, however, appears collateral to the central question of
enforcement. If it is determined that wagering contracts are violative of
public policy, a stipulated damages provision used to disguise a gambling
transaction would be unenforceable. Without empirical data indicating that
wagering contracts are prevalent in liquidated damages provisions, a pre-
sumption of legitimate risk allocation would appear to reflect more accu-
rately the use of stipulated damage provisions in commercial contracts. The
danger of wagering seems sufficiently remote to leave invalidation to
explicit proof of a gambling transaction, rather than using it as a rationale
for invalidating all agreements which allocate risks based on unprovable
reliance.
The second rationale supporting the indemnity principle is the per-
ceived moral hazard that accompanies the allocation of idiosyncratic risk to
a third-party insurer. The very nature of unprovable value heightens the
risk that the assessed valuation will overcompensate the insured, providing
incentives for fraudulent claims of loss .77 Limiting the recovery to provable
loss, irrespective of the stipulated value, will reduce the moral hazard by
some amount. Again, the choice that must be resolved is whether the
savings produced by reducing the frequency of fraudulent claims of loss
exceeds the increase in enforcement costs due to undercompensation and
reduced contracting flexibility. Absent empirical evidence, there is no per-
suasive reason to invalidate an entire range of legitimate bargains in order
to produce an indeterminate reduction in moral risk. Faced with uncer-
76. See INSURANCE LAW, supra note 74, at 89-90; Patterson, Insurable Interest in Lfe, 18
COLUM. L. REV. 381, 386 (1018). Professor Keeton asserts that the policy against wagering
has been a major influence in formulating the indemnity principle. The underlying evils to be
discouraged are felt to include vice, idleness, impoverishment, misery, crime, and the dis-
couragement of useful work. BASIC INSURANCE, supra note 74, at 89; Patterson, supra, at 386.
77. INSURANCE LAW, supra note 74, at 88.
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tainty, efficiency may well be maximized by a less inclusive rule which
denies recovery of loss induced by fraud once evidence of fraudulent
conduct is established.
Although the probability of fraud induced by moral risk will not be
eliminated in the direct insurer model, it should be a smaller risk than in the
case of third-party insurance against idiosyncratic loss. Assume that
Lloyd's of London sells a policy to the promisee with an excessive recov-
ery amount. There comes a point under this contract where collusive
breach between the promisor and promisee becomes profitable. Our
hypothetical alumnus, for example, would bribe the bus company to breach
and make Lloyd's pay most of the cost. The risk of this collusion against
the insurer is clearly nonexistent when the provider of the product is the
insurer.
The rationales supporting the indemnity principle indicate that limiting
recovery for nonprovable loss may produce a decrease in the probability of
fraud and the enforcement of socially detrimental gambling contracts. Un-
like the absolute sanction of the penalty rule, however, the indemnity
principle in insurance contracts is not applied when competing values with
greater benefits are identifiable. 78 The valued policy doctrine permits par-
ties to an insurance contract to avoid the limitations of the indemnity
principle by stipulating a valuation which will be payable upon proof of
loss. 79 Stipulated value policies originated in marine insurance because
valuation based on indemnity was too imprecise to insure full recovery.
They are commonly used to insure items of tangible personalty where
market value is not a reliable indicator of subjective worth.80
This valued policy alternative indicates that the indemnity principle
can be efficiently applied. 81 Where the expected costs of undervaluation
78. "In some instances, however, the evils are more than balanced by the costs of
effective safeguards-the two most significant costs being a reduction in flexibility of insur-
ance arrangements and an increase in expense of administration. The result is that rules of
insurance law fall short of compelling strict adherence to the principle of indemnity" See
BASIC INSURANCE, supra note 74, at 69.
79. See generally INSURANCE LAW, supra note 74, at 140-42; W. YOUNG, INSURANCE,
CASES & MATERIALS 558-59 (1971). In selecting a valued policy, the parties "mean to
substitute their present assessment for the result of later controversy. In the absence of fraud
this is as conclusive as in the case of any other damages; and indeed valued insurance is only
an instance of stipulated damages." St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Line Oil Co., 63 F.2d
771, 772 (2d Cir. 1933) (emphasis added).
80. Professor Young identifies jewelry, works of art, vessels, and cargo as those subjects
that are commonly insured with a valued policy. W. YOUNG, supra note 79, at 558.
81. In a related development, many jurisdictions have enacted valued policy statutes
which require the insurer to satisfy claims for specific types of real property insurance at full
policy valuation. This legislation is based primarily on the notion that the insurer should be
required to make the risk and valuation determinations at the time of contracting. Assuming
competitive bargaining, the insurer should not be permitted to exact a premium for a stipu-
lated amount of insurance and, upon loss, assert the indemnity principle to limit his liability to
provable exchange valuation. "Valued policy" legislation commonly applies to fire insurance
on buildings and other fixtures. In some jurisdictions the coverage is extended to other types
of property insurance. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-905 (1964) (coverage for loss caused
by fire, tornado and lightning). Some statutes have been extended to personal property in spite
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exceed the benefits in reducing the probability of fraud or wagering, the
legal system will enforce insurance contracts covering nonprovable
idiosyncratic value. We conclude, therefore, that existing legal restraints
on fraud and gambling are adequate substitutes for controlling the in-
creased social cost resulting from the enforcement hypothesis.
C. Changed Conditions: Inefficient Performance and Induced Breach
The enforcement hypothesis proves a persuasive basis for a new legal
doctrine as long as the assumption of fairly-bargained exchange justifies
confidence in end-result efficiency. A challenge to that assumption is
posed, however, by the problem of changed economic conditions. The
nature of the problem can be illustrated by examining the case of Rocking-
ham County v. Luten Bridge Co. s2 In Rockingham the county contracted
with the bridge company to construct a bridge to provide a connecting link
with a hard surface road to be constructed simultaneously. Subsequently,
the construction of the road was terminated during a political dispute, and
the county moved to repudiate the bridge contract. At the time of repudia-
tion, the company had incurred $2,000 in reliance costs. The company
continued work on the bridge until six months after repudiation and then
instituted action against the county for $18,500 representing work per-
formed under the contract.
Denying recovery for the work performed after repudiation, the court
applied classic mitigation principles in holding that, "it is inflicting damage
on the defendant without benefit to the plaintiff to allow the latter to insist
in proceeding with the contract." 8 3 The court in Rockingham correctly
identified and applied the just compensation principle to the changed condi-
tions problem. Any further recovery would have produced a disincentive to
efficient breach, and prevented a preferred reallocation of resources by the
promisee.
Assume, however, that in the initial contract the county attached a
substantial, nonprovable value to full performance, and secured a promise
by the company that upon nonperformance it would pay a stipulated
damage of $20,000. The cancellation of the road building project reduced
the value of the performance to the county to $1000. Assume further that a
of the increased moral hazard. See, e.g., Duckworth v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 452 S.W.2d 280 (Mo. App. 1970).
Although subject to extensive criticism by commentators, see, e.g., BASIC INSURANCE,
supra note 74, at 142; W. YOUNG, supra note 79, at 559, valued policy statutes intuitively
reflect the jurisprudential paradigm of the mutually beneficial market exchange.
82. 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929).
83. Id. at 307. The court correctly grounded its decision on the principle of compensa-
tion:
The legal right of either party to violate, abandon, or renounce his contract, on the
usual terms of compensation to the other for the damages which the law recognizes
and allows, subject to.the jurisdiction of equity to decree specific performance in
proper cases, is universally recognized and acted upon.
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change in raw material prices will produce an estimated $15,000 loss to the
bridge company if full performance is required. Under the current legal
rule, the in terrorem $20,000 damage clause would be unenforceable and
the parties would be left to conventional damage measures. This would
induce a breach by the bridge company, and the payment of $1000 expecta-
tion damages-an efficiency-maximizing result. However, under the en-
forcement hypothesis the county is provided with an incentive to demand
full performance by the company and simultaneously attempt to induce
br~ach in order to collect the $20,000.
Ipefficient performance is the first problem posed by the chariged
conditions dilemma. The efficiency criterion indicates that the bridge
shou'ld not be built where the return performance is no longer valued by the
promisee. Given ordinary market assumptions, however, the bridge never
will be built. Since performance has become less valuable to the promisee
he is induced to negotiate with the promisor to permit him to buy out from
performance. The county would be willing to accept any payment over
$1,000, and the bridge company would be willing to pay any amount less
than $15,000. These sums represent the respective gain and loss which will
accrue to each party if the bridge is completed. At some point, they will
negotiate an agreement to divide the gains from breach that would be
captured entirely by the breaching bridge company under the current legal
rule.
Clearly, renegotiation produces transaction costs that would not arise
under the penalty rule. It is tempting to measure these costs against the
expected savings in litigation costs and propose whichever rule promotes
the least costly alternative. However, since this measurement can only be
made ex post by the legal mechanism, taking this approach would produce
additional litigation costs in all cases. The enforcement hypothesis is the
more efficient rule, because it permits an ex ante measurement of the
expected costs. s4 The parties must be assumed to have taken all the
expected costs into consideration at the time they elected to negotiate an
agreed damages provision. In sum, the very existence of a freely negotiated
agreed damages provision is compelling presumptive evidence that it con-
stitutes the cost-minimizing alternative. This analysis is consistent with
contract rules which assign responsibility for allocated risks, and excuse
performance only where circumstances indicate risk was unassigned.8 5
84. It could be hypothesized that if the legal rule could be constructed precisely to
categorize and enforce only those agreements where renegotiation costs are less than the
litigation costs, ex post measurement would be superior. This hypothesis is rejected because
such a rule would require numerous factual considerations, and would necessarily be rela-
tively imprecise, see Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 55, at 261-62, and since the total costs of
litigation are not imposed on the losing litigant, there is an incentive to attempt to secure
non-enforcement even where it is probable that the agreement will be found enforceable. This
would impose transaction costs also on those cases where enforcement would be required.
85. In general, in order for inability to perform fully to be considered a legal excuse, the
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The second problem posed by the changed conditions dilemma is the
increased incentive that the promisee has to induce breach in order to
capture the $19,000 premium contained in the in terrorem clause. The
prospective payoff would encourage the county to urge full performance
and then attempt to induce a breach rather than negotiate an efficient
release from the contract. The enforcement hypothesis would produce an
increase of some amount in the social costs of policing against fraud or
non-cooperation by the promisee. However, absent empirical data indicat-
ing the extent of these costly effects, the least restrictive assumption-
invalidation for induced breach when those facts are identified-is sug-
gested again. In any event, the moral risk produced by the changed condi-
tions dilemma is reduced where the promisor provides the insurance.
Third-party insurance in this situation would produce the heightened risk of
collusive breach between the contracting parties.8 6
D. Conditions for Non-Enforcement: Unfairness and Bargaining Abnor-
malities
1. Presumption of Fair Exchange. The underlying premise of the
enforcement hypothesis is that, in the absence of bargaining unfairness, a
stipulated damage clause reflects equivalent value. The possibility that a
given provision does not reflect subjective compensation, but is penal in
nature, is irrelevant to the question of enforcement unless this fact is
caused by bargaining abnormalities. This premise is a derivative of what
can be described as the flexibility principle of private exchange.8 7 Assum-
ing no violation of process constraints, the subjective value of exchange is
not amenable to judicial scrutiny.88 Except by controlling the subject
failure of performance must be caused by factors which were not allocated risks of the
bargain. A failure of presupposed conditions (e.g., destruction of specific goods) or unforesee-
able, and therefore unallocated, circumstances will avoid the contract to the extent of the
failure. See U.C.C. § 2-613, 2-614, & 2-615. Allocation of casualty risks by agreement has
long been a permissible exercise of contracting flexibility. For example, sales contracts
frequently expand the excuses for nonperformance well beyond the parameters of legal excuse
outlined above. See I A. CoRBIN, supra note 3, § 148; 3 Id. § 642; 6 Id. § 1331. Similarly,
agreements frequently allocate risks to the promisor which would otherwise form a basis of
legal excuse. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 88 451 (Comment c), 456 (Comment c),
458 (Comment d), 465 (Comment g) (1932).
86. See text accompanying notes 77-78 supra.
87. This principle has been variously described as the freedom or power to contract. It
most readily identifies the efficiency criterion-permitting resources to flow to their highest
valued uses.
The following model is suggested for the application of the flexibility principle: In a
costless environment, the sole principle of market exchange would be flexibility. The parties
would negotiate deals without constraints, and renegotiate upon non-performance with the
only role of legal institutions being to enforce the private agreement, including sanctions,
according to its terms. Facing positive transactions costs, however, the legal system provides
read,'-made rules based on common assumptions about typical contracting behavior. These
"off the rack" contract rules reduce the costs of exchange by specifying the legal conse-
quences of typical bargains where the expected cost of explicit negotiation exceeds the utility
derived from individualized exchange. It is only where idiosyncratic value exceeds negotiating
costs, therefore, that contractual flexibility induces privately concocted alternative arrange-
ments.
88. The doctrine of adequacy of consideration, for example, represents an explicit at-
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matter,8 9 no neutral principle has been devised to evaluate the relative
worth of a voluntary, freely-bargained exchange. 90 Instead, contracts doc-
trine has developed fairness constraints which focus on the maintenance of
process values-full access to information and competitive market oppor-
tunities. 91 The enforcement hypothesis relies on this jurisprudential tradi-
tempt to reject the moral imperatives of the early common law principle of objective value.
The basic premise of the adequacy doctrine is that if there is a legal (i.e. "sufficient")
consideration for a promise the courts will not question its adequacy. Buckner v. McIlroy, 31
Ark. 631, 634 (1877); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 81 (1932). As expressed by the
Restatement, "the relative values of a promise and the consideration for it do not affect the
sufficiency of consideration." Id. The rationale for the doctrine is that the parties to a bargain,
and not the courts, are best suited to determine the adequacy of an exchange. Therefore,
"inadequacy of consideration, exorbitance of price or improvidence in a contract will not, in
the absence of fraud, constitute a defense .. " Hotze v. Schlarsen, 410 Ill. 265, 102 N.E. 2d
131, 133 (1951). The doctrine does not, however, prevent a court from questioning the
integrity of the bargaining process in cases in which the consideration given for a promise is so
insufficient as to indicate that fraud, unfairness or unconscionability entered into the bargain-
ing process.
Courts, though they have long arms, cannot relieve one of the consequences of a
contract merely because it was unwise. They are not guardians in general to the
people at large, but where inadequacy of price is such as to shock their conscience
equity is alert to seize upon the slightest circumstance indicative of fraud, either
actual or constructive.
Planters Nat'l Bank v. Heflin Co., 166 Va. 166, 173, 184 S.E. 216, 219 (1936). See also
Horowitz, supra note 12, at 918, 923-27; 35 COLUM. L. REV. 1090-91 (1935).
In spite of the perceived movement in American law toward increased scrutiny of private
exchange, the general principle of party autonomy remains. See, e.g., Braucher, Freedom of
Contract and the Second Restatement, 78 YALE L. J. 598 (1969).
89. See generally note 12 supra; G. GRISMORE, supra note 3, at 499. Traditionally,
control over the subject matter of a bargain has been founded on the doctrine of illegality. This
doctrine prohibits the making and, in some instances, the enforcement of certain agreements.
It does so for much the same reason that the criminal law prohibits certain conduct, because
such conduct is "contrary to the best interests of society .. " Id. In determining which
agreements are, in fact, illegal, courts rely alternatively upon statutes and the broad rubric of
"public policy." For example, bargains involving a wager have long been held to be illegal
and unenforceable, based in part on the rationale that they act so as to create risk rather than
to allocate an already existing risk. For a full discussion of illegality, see 6A A. CORBIN, supra
note 3, §§ 1373-1541.
90. Instead of attempting to evaluate the end result of exchange, the doctrinal concern of
bargain contract has traditionally centered on the necessity of reliable, objective evidence of a
voluntary exchange. See generally L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 29-32, 69-77; J. W. HURST,
supra note 12, at 11-12; Horowitz, supra note 12. The objective test of the existence of
bargain, the formal doctrine of consideration focusing on the quid pro quo, and the benefit-
detriment expression of an exchange arrived at by bargaining-all represented efforts to
provide legal support to the operation of a free entry market.
Professor Speidel views the bargain theory as serving crucial needs in a market economy
by providing formal controls to channel the market exchange, protecting the exchange trans-
action and "shielding the creative or idiosyncratic bargainer from later claims that the agreed
exchange was disproportionate." Speidel, An Essay on the Reported Death and Continued
Vitality of Contract, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1170 (1975).
91. The most ambitious effort to bring the traditional categories of unfairness-fraud,
duress, incapacity-under a single analytical umbrella is represented in the emerging doctrine
of unconscionability. As reflected in U.C.C. § 2-302 the unconscionability principle is largely
devoid of substantive context. Some commentary has concluded that efforts to provide any
analytical structure are essentially futile-that unconscionability represents the subjective
reactions of the particular decision-maker to the unfairness of a particular transaction. See
Leff, Unconscionability and tie Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485
(1967).
The major thrust of much of the unconscionability scholarship has been to seize upon
Comment I to U.C.C. § 2-302 proscribing "unfair surprise" and "oppression." These two
factors have been described respectively as "procedural" and "substantive" unconscionabil-
ity, see id. at 503, and have been used by many in an effort to merge the traditional constraints
identified earlier. See generally, Braucher, The Unconscionable Contract or Term, 31 U.
PITT. L. REV. 337 (1970); Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PITT. L. REV.
1 (1969); Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931 (1969);
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tion by incorporating a presumption of fair exchange. 92 Under this pre-
sumption, evidence that equivalent value was not exchanged for the liqui-
dated damages provision would be relevant only to the extent that it
permitted an inference as to the relative unfairness of the bargaining pro-
cess. This analysis has been consistently applied by courts and legislatures
to agreements for underliquidated or "limited" damages. These partial
allocations of the risk of breach to the nonbreacher have been enforced
absent specific evidence of unfairness. 93 The enforcement hypothesis, by
validating liquidated damage clauses which allocate similar risks to the
breacher, does not raise any unique dangers of fraud or duress. Rather, the
two situations present perfectly symmetrical fairness issues. 94
Speidel, Unconscionable Assent and Consumer Protection, 31 U. PITT. L. REv. 359 (1970).
All of these efforts at providing analytical clarity to the unconscionability doctrine seem to
founder on the problem of structuring a neutral principle by which a contract can be deter-
mined to be substantively unfair.
The problem of substantive evaluation of the utility of the bargain can be avoided by
limiting the unconscionability principle to a process control-falling solely within procedural
unconscionability. The doctrine can thus be viewed as a method of defining bargaining
abnormalities more precisely than through the traditional doctrines of fraud and duress as well
as a more precise status c, rtrol where assumptions concerning competitive market conditions
are invalid. See text accompanying notes 95-103 infra. See also Epstein, Unconscionability: A
Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. L. & EcoN. 293 (1976) for a recent discussion which argues for
the limitation of the unconscionability principle to a process control.
92. The primary significance of the presumption of fair exchange is the reallocation of the
burden of proof of unfairness from the promisee to the promisor. The impact of the burden of
proof under the penalty rule is illustrated in Waggoner v. Johnston, 408 P.2d 761 (Okla. 1965),
where the court allocated the burden of establishing that the damages were difficult to
ascertain on the non-breacher seeking to enforce the agreement. The fact that the parties have
expressly stated that the damages are difficult to estimate does not shift the burden of proof to
the breacher under present law. Id. at 768.
93. The disparity between the controls on underliquidated provisions and the limitations
on penal agreements has long been recognized. See, e.g., 5 A. CORaIN, supra note 3, § 1068:
Public policy may forbid the enforcement of penalties against a defendant, but it does
not forbid the enforcement of a limitation in his favor. Parties sometimes make
agreements and expressly provide that they shall not be enforceable at all, by any
remedy legal or equitable .... Where a contract provides that damages for breach
shall not be recoverable beyond a specified sum, it is obvious that the risk of loss
beyond that sum is being assumed by the promisee. If the law allows him to assume
the whole risk, with no remedy whatever, it is obvious that it will allow him to
assume a part less than the whole.
See also 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, at § 781A; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339,
Comment g (1932); Sweet, Underliquidated Damages As Limitations of Flexibility, 33 TEx. L.
REv. 196, 203-06, 212-19 (1954).
In Cellulose Acetate Silk Co. v. Widnes Foundry, [1933] A.C. 20 (H.L.), Lord Atkin
in sustaining an agreement to limit delay damages to £-20 per week stated:
It appears to me that such sum is provided as compensation in place of the no
compensation at all which would otherwise have been the result.... I agree that it is
not a preestimate of actual damage. I think it must have been obvious to both the
parties that the actual damages would be much more than £20 a week; but it was
intended to go toward the damage, and it was all that the sellers were prepared to
pay.
Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
A similar result was reached in American Dist, Tel, go. v. Roberts & Son, Inc., 219 Ala.
595, 122 So. 837 (1929), where the court sustained qp underliquidated damage agreement
fixing recovery for defects in a fire alarm system to $5Q.00. The Court stated:
As w6 view this clause, it is but a limitatioi of the amount recoverable in case of the
breach of the contract. . . . Conceding, Ilowever, that, by limiting the amount of
recoverable damages, it operates as a burdep or hardship on the plaintiff, still we are
not at liberty, by analogous authorities, to make a new contract for the parties or to
strike therefrom a clause well understood and evidently within the intention of the
parties.
Id. at 598 (emphasis added).
94. Although the analysis is identical in both cases, the legal rules diverge. Underliqui-
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2. Unfairness and the Efficiency Criterion. The enforcement hypothe-
sis identifies unfairness or other bargaining aberrations as the only lim-
itations on the use of liquidated damages provisions. The normative notions
of fairness implicit in the common law tradition are consistent with the
analytical model of economic efficiency. Bargaining unfairness precludes
the assumption of fair exchange and increases the risk of allocative in-
efficiencies. The inefficient effects of unfairness include an increase in the
incidence of erroneously valued exchange as well as the increased social
costs of fraud, misrepresentation, and duress. Asserting the inefficiencies
of unfairness is not helpful analytically unless neutral principles can be
identified within the fairness rubric. In the bargain context, two neutral
principles may justify constraints on contracting flexibility.
Access to information at minimum cost is the first principle of bargain
fairness. Where the bargain reflects processes which inhibit information
exchange, the risk of allocative inefficiencies is enhanced. This constraint,
identified in the unconscionability doctrine as "unfair surprise," 95 would
incorporate contracting behavior ranging from fraudulent exchange of false
or misleading information 96 to failures to reasonably disclose essential
contract terms. 97 This incentive to information exchange will maximize
dated damages have been traditionally subject only to a process constraint of bargaining
fairness and not to the additional controls that have been imposed on liquidated damage
agreements. See Personal Fin. Co. v. Meredith, 39 Ill. App.3d 695, 350 N.E.2d 781 (1976);
Shaer Shoe Corp. v. Granite State Alarm, Inc., 110 N.H. 132, 262 A.2d 285 (1970). The
clearest portrait of this anomaly is captured by U.C.C. § 2-718 and its comments.
Comment 1 provides: "A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is expressly
made void as a penalty. An unreasonably small amount would be subject to similar criticism
and might be stricken under the section on unconscionable contracts or clauses." (emphasis
added).
The clear import of this comment is that underliquidated damages are subject only to the
fairness limitations of § 2-302, while "overliquidated" provisions are subject to the additional,
absolute constraint of the penalty rule in § 2-718(1).
95. U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1. Section 2-302 is the most significant statutory expression
of the unconscionability doctrine. Other than directing the focus of the court to the bargaining
process, the statutory language contains no substantive guidance as to the nature of the
bargaining unfairness to be found void under the doctrine. Comment I to § 2-302 contains an
expression of principle: "The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair
surprise . . . and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining
power." Illustrations of the "unfair surprise" component of bargaining unfairness would
presumptively include traditional instances of fraudulent misrepresentation, as well as at-
tempts to obscure the nature of the exchange by disguising relevant information in extra
language or contract terms. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 91, at 16-18; Slawson, Mass
Contracts: Lawfid Fraud in California, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 11-14 (1974). The doctrine is
typically applied to the paradigm "fine print" provision in a standard form contract creating a
presumption that there was no consent to the bargain in fact.
96. Traditional controls on false or misleading information incorporate fraudulent misrep-
resentation or deceit as well as negligent and innocent misrepresentation. See, e.g., King v.
O'Reilly Motor Co., 16 Ariz. App. 518, 494 P.2d 718 (1972) (car sold "as new" was a
previously wrecked demonstrator); Town & Country Chrysler Plymouth v. Porter, 11 Ariz.
App. 369, 464 P.2d 815 (1970) (car odometer turned back); Eno Brick Corp. v. Barber-Greene
Co., 109 N.H. 156, 245 A.2d 545 (1968); Lanners v. Whitney, 247 Or. 223, 428 P.2d 398
(1967). See also Epstein, supra note 91, at 298-300.
97. Simple non-disclosure of material facts has rarely been considered the kind of infor-
mation barrier which will preclude enforcement of the agreement. On the other hand, evidence
of concealment or partial disclosure will frequently bar enforcement of the resulting bargain.
The concealment issue is manifested in standardized contracts in the requirement that
provisions allocating significant risks be conspicuous. See Lacks v. Bottled Gas Corp., 215
Va. 94, 205 S.E.2d 671 (1974); U.C.C. §§ 1-201(10), 2-316(3).
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efficiency by reducing the transaction costs of acquiring information.
The second fairness principle supports the maximizing of competitive
market opportunities. Bargaining aberrations which inhibit competitive
exchange will tend to produce inefficient resource allocation. The iden-
tifiable bargaining abnormalities would encompass duress 98 as well as the
more traditional cases of monopoly. 99 The fairness value of enhanced
market opportunities has also traditionally been reflected in the uncon-
scionability doctrine. Scrutinizing a bargain produced by "oppression" 10
or "absence of meaningful choice" 10 1 is a response to the perceived in-
efficiencies of reduced markets. The benefits of this response by the private
law doctrine of unconscionability, however, remain indeterminate. 10 2
If this elaborated definition of unfairness is incorporated into the en-
forcement hypothesis, the following decision rule would be proposed:
Liquidated damage provisions should be enforced in all cases
unless evidence of information barriers or reduced competitive
opportunities rebuts the presumption of fair exchange. 10 3
3. Party Sophistication and Presumptions of Unfairness. The jurispru-
dential anomaly of the penalty rule is the imposition of a second level
fairness constraint. There is no reason to presume that liquidated damages
provisions are more susceptible to duress or other bargaining aberrations
than other contractual allocations of risk. Consequently, the extraordinary
limitation seems to produce many more costly effects than are warranted
98. Duress focuses on impermissible means used to obtain consent to the exchange.
Duress requires an individual to abandon one legal right (property or physical integrity) in
order to secure another. See Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH.
L. RFv. 253 (1947); Epstein, supra note 91, at 295-698.
99. The traditional objection to the monopolist is that he will only offer additional units of
goods until his marginal revenue equals his marginal cost; an excess of marginal cost over
marginal revenues would imply losses on additional units produced. Since marginal revenue is
less than price, society evaluates additional output at a magnitude higher than its additional
cost, but it is no longer profitable for the monopolist to produce such socially desirable output
increments. In that sense a monopoly is inefficient. Asserting the inefficiency of monopoly
does not, however, necessarily require the conclusion that a sale by a monopolist should be
considered unfair. The buyer from the monopolist is clearly different from the buyer facing
information barriers, where it can be argued that the individual bargainer has misperceived his
utility. Professor Alan Schwartz has argued that the monopolist will ascertain and supply
buyer preferences as well as competitive sellers. Schwartz, Seller Unequal Bargaining Power
and the Judicial Process, 49 IND. L.J. 367 (1974). However, if the monopolist's utility
function is perceived as a mix of price, quantity, and other qualitative factors (i.e., plus or
minus risks), it may be that although consumers would pay for a different risk allocation, the
monopolist will not offer it.
100. U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1.
101. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
102. Even conceding the inefficiencies of monopoly, the difficult question remains. How
should private contract law respond? One possible response is to refuse to enforce certain risk
allocations where the seller has monopoly power. This would require the monopoly power to
be exercised through price alone, which might reduce the search costs of disclosing
monopolies. However, any benefits in aiding antitrust enforcement may well be exceeded by
the litigation costs of challenging contracts of monopolists as unconscionable. After a
thorough analysis of the problem Professor Schwartz argues that monopoly should not be a
relevant factor in determining whether or not to declare a contract unconscionable. See
generally Schwartz, Unconscionable Factors, 63 VA. L. REv. - (1977).
103. See text accompanying notes 87-94 supra.
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by the perceived risk of unfairness. Nonetheless, it is clear that party
sophistication will often be a relevant issue in determining the fairness of a
stipulated damages provision.10 4 Many contracting parties may not be
capable of calculating the risks necessary to bargain for the in terrorem
clause at an equivalent price. It is clear that some parties are incompetent
to act as direct insurers of idiosyncratic value. 105
The problem of status does not justify the current rule under which
these agreements are conclusively unenforceable in all cases. Nonetheless,
a presumption of unfairness (and unenforceability) might well be appropri-
ate in those factual contexts where the expected unfairness costs exceed
the expected gains from unlimited contracting flexibility. For instance, if
there exists an identifiable class of cases where application of the enforce-
ment hypothesis predictably produces a high incidence of unfairness, the
social costs can be reduced by attaching the unfairness presumption to
those cases alone. This less restrictive limitation on contracting flexibility
could be rebutted by the promisee's demonstrating that the clause was a
product of a fairly-bargained exchange. As part of his burden of proof, the
promisee would be required to demonstrate that the parties had sufficient
commercial sophistication and access to information to allocate fairly the
identified risks.
CONCLUSION
The historical background of the penalty rule discloses initial judicial
interference to protect against fraud and duress in a legal context where
alternative, less costly, protections were not available. Subsequently, in-
validation was grounded on a presumption of unfairness based on indica-
tions that information barriers prevented rational assessment of the nature
and extent of the risk allocations produced by the agreement. The costs of
identifying unfairness in individual cases generated pressure for a rule
invalidating these clauses on more precise criteria. Applying the compensa-
tion limitation to liquidated damages appeared to satisfy these wants and
consequently received wide acceptance. Since the roots of the penalty rule
were nourished on fairness concerns, it is not surprising that generations of
lawyers have clung to the view that penalties are "bad." This notion does
104. The following statement is an example:
[Clourts are beginning to look with favor upon stipulated damage provisions between
parties who have equality of opportunity for understanding and insisting upon their
rights.
Waggoner v. Johnston, 408 P.2d 761, 770 (Okla. 1965).
105. The problem of inability of certain contracting parties to maximize their own welfare
through liquidated damages clauses should be regarded as part of the general question of
incompetence, which, like infancy, insanity and drunkenness, rebuts the presumption of fair
exchange. See Epstein, supra note 91, at 300-01. A similar analysis has been proposed as a
limitation on state enforcement of consensual arrangements for provisional creditor remedies
upon default. See Scott, Constitutional Regulation of Provisional Creditor Remedies: The
Cost of Procedural Due Process, 61 VA. L. REv. 807, 862-64 (1975).
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not withstand rigorous, dispassionate analysis. The current penalty rule
does not promote end results which are any "fairer" than an enforcement
rule. The behavior which requires regulation is unfairness in bargaining.
The penalty rule, however, fails to mirror accurately the proscribed behav-
ior.10 6 Consequently, the penalty rule is used as a second level control
together with standard restrictions on process unfairness.
Challenging the penalty rule demonstrates that it has numerous costly
effects. First, the rule denies true compensation to the promisee with
non-provable idiosyncratic wants, inducing him either to protect those
wants with inefficient third party insurance'0 7 or to suffer exposure to
inefficient breaches.108 Secondly, assuming that cases of non-compensable
idiosyncratic value are rare, the rule produces a more significant cost by
inducing review of the entire continuum of cases where liquidated damages
provisions are intended to reimburse true losses which are to any extent
uncertain.
The modern development of unconscionability as a unifying fairness
principle presents a less costly alternative to the sweeping invalidation
powers exercised under the penalty rule. 0 9 With our present enhanced
access to information and consequential greater accuracy in individual risk
evaluation, an enforcement model which facilitates the recovery of
difficult-to-prove values would appear to maximize the allocative efficiency
of the contracting process.
In sum, contemporary cost-benefit analysis suggests that the tradi-
tional penalty rule is anachronistic for several reasons: (1) the efficiency
costs of the rule are now apparent in the light of modern analysis; (2) the
market imperfections once addressed by the rule have become empirically
less important; and (3) more selective legal doctrines, such as uncon-
scionability, have developed as remedies for those market imperfections
which retain practical importance.
106. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 55, at 262-68. The penalty rule is both underinclu-
sive and overinclusive. That is, some bargains which are infected by unfairness are not
proscribed; while others-as in the case of idiosyncratic reliance-are invalidated in spite of a
fairly-bargained exchange.
107. See text accompanying notes 66-71 supra.
108. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
109. A number of courts have indicated a willingness to limit the penalty rule to a fairness
test. See, e.g., Gruschus v. C. R. Davis Contracting Co., 75 N.M. 649, 409 P.2d 500 (1965)
("As a general rule, enforcement of such a clause will only be denied when the stipulated
amount is so extravagant or disproportionate as to show fraud, mistake or oppression.").
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